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I. THE WORD AND THE LAW
In the beginning was the word, and the word was with the law, and the
word was law.' This symposium on law and linguistics marks the
triumphant conclusion to a beginning, the completion of the "intentionally
narrow undertaking"2 launched by Lawrence M. Solan3 and his cohorts in
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School; Visiting Professor, Facult6
de Droit et des Sciences Politiques, Universit6 de Nantes, France. B.A. (1987) (English), M.A. (1987)
(English and Linguistics), Emory University; J.D. (1991) Harvard University. I acknowledge the
financial support of the Conseil G6n6ral de Loire-Atlantique. Ithank Phil Frickey forhelpful comments.
Meredith McQuaid provided invaluable help with the Japanese language.
I. Cf John 1:1; Harold J. Berman, Law and Logos, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 143, 145 (1994).
2. Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561 (1994).
3. See LAWRENCE M. SoLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993); Lawrence M. Solan, When
Judges Use the Dictionary, 68 Am. SPEECH 50 (1993).
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the Law and Linguistics Consortium.4 By "using linguistics to critique
judicial decisions [that] treat[] ambiguous texts as if they were plain," these
pioneers have begun to explore different ways in which "analysis of
ambiguous texts by linguists could actually assist judges in identifying and
choosing among possible [legal] interpretations."' True to the tradition of
Clark Cunningham,6 the law and linguistics movement has dedicated itself
to resolving specific, concrete legal problems. In the classic fashion of
practical lawyering, it has "identiffied] an issue" in one or another statutory
dispute, "assemble[d] the available information, [and] evaluate[d] potential
responses" based on the state of the linguistic art.7 Linguistic analysis of
law has focused on discrete "cases and controversies,"' and the federal
courts have returned the favor by citing Solan's The Language of Judges9
and Plain Meaning and Hard Cases,t0 the Yale Law Journal review of
Solan's work. As tribute to the movement's phenomenal success, two of
America's foremost experts on statutory interpretation have advised the
Office of the Solicitor General to "hire some good linguists."'"
We who have learned to sail amid the sea of indeterminate legal
language 2 should thank linguistic analysis of law for spotting "a few
more stars by which to steer."'" Perhaps the time has come for us to
4. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Law and Linguistics Consortium in Support of Respondents
at 1, United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994) (No. 93-723) (identifying the
members of the Consortium as Clark D. Cunningham, Georgia M. Green, Jeffrey P. Kaplan, Judith N.
Levi, and Lawrence B. Solan-the authors of the works cited supra notes 2 and 3).
5. Cunningham et al., supra note 2, at 1561.
6. See Clark D. Cunningham & Charles J. Fillmore, Using Common Sense: A Linguistic
Perspective on Judicial Interpretations of "Use a Firearm," 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1157 (1995); Clark D.
Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal
Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992) [hereinafter Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator];
Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2459 (1989) [hereinafter Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients]; Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic
Analysis of the Meanings of "Search " in the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IOWA
L. REV. 541 (1988) [hereinafter Cunningham, A Search for Common Sense].
7. Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
791, 791 (1994).
8. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
9. See Overhauser v. United States, 45 F.3d 1085, 1087 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.).
10. See Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 114 S. Ct. 2251,
2255 (1994); Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1806 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); United
States v. Granderson, 114 S. Ct. 1259, 1267 n.10 (1994); United States v. Davis, 872 F. Supp. 1475,
1479 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1995).
11. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law
as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 26, 73 n.204 (1994).
12. See JAMEs BOYD WHTE, WHEN WoRDs LOSE THEIR MEANNo 278 (1984).
13. Cunningham et al., supra note 2, at 1617.
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envision even grander ambitions. Let us build a tower that will reach
beyond the stars; let us chance whatever consequences may befall us. 4
What else can the law learn from linguistics? Or, perhaps more intriguing-
ly, what can linguistics tell us about the way we learn law? "In the
inductive, constantly evolving world of law,"'" in an intellectual mael-
strom whose complexities approach those of economic and terrestrial
ecosystems, 16 we know not what we might discover if we think of law,
linguistics, and the connection between law and linguistics as "a continuous
process of learning and experimentation.""
Law and linguistics scholarship has focused on matters of semantics,
syntax, and pragmatics-the essentials of meaning, sentence structure, and
noncontextual aspects of language. 8 Like any other science, linguistics
begins from basic building blocks and works its way through the
synchronic, diachronic, and comparative study of language. 9 This
progression from specific linguistic components to more general classes
gives linguistics an undeniably inductive quality." The next wave of law
and linguistics scholarship may find that its essential project lies in finding
the most fruitful level of scientific specificity. If too refined, too "pure,"
and not sufficiently "applied," linguistics has little to offer the law. Without
fanfare, Plain Meaning and Hard Cases relegated its discussion of
phonetics, phonology, and morphology to a single footnote.2' One must
14. Compare Gen. 11:1-9 (describing how God foiled the Tower of Babel by "confounding" the
speech of its builders and rendering them unable to "understand one another's speech") with Acts 2:1-14
(describing how the the words of the disciples at Pentecost were understood by each of the represented
nationalities in its own language). See generally Berman, supra note 1, at 165 ("Implicit in the story
of the Tower of Babel is the story of Pentecost, [which] gives hope that ... by translation from one
language to another all peoples of the world may, by the power of a higher spiritual truth, share each
other's experiences vicariously and become ... united.').
15. Jim Chen & Daniel J. Gifford, Law as Industrial Policy: Economic Analysis of Law in a New
Key, 25 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 1315, 1345 (1995).
16. Cf generally RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF
ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982) 23-48, 206-45 (applying the insights of evolutionary biology in a critique
of neoclassical economics).
17. Farber, supra note 7, at 791.
18. See Cunningham et al., supra note 2, at 1568.
19. Compare FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURS DE LINGUISTIQUE GtNRALE 63-95 (2d ed. 1948)
(expounding basic principles of phonology) with id. at 141-289 (surveying synchronic, diachronic, and
geographic variations in language).
20. See Louis HJELMSLEV, PROLOGOMENA TO A THEORY Oi LANGUAGE 11-12 (Francis J.
Whitfield trans. 1961) (translating Louis HJELMSLEV, OMKRING SPROOTERIENS GRUNDLEGGELSE 12
(1943))
21. See Cunningham et al., supra note 2, at 1568 n.25. See generally Mort6za Mahmondian,
Modem Theories of Language: The Empirical Challenge 38-40 (1993) (placing semantics, syntax,
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strain to imagine how the mechanics of sound production or the sound
system of the English language might affect the law.22 Linguistics at too
high a level of abstraction likewise seems unhelpful. American law rarely
considers the nuances of foreign languages,' and afortiori the entire field
of comparative linguistics, especially as applied in the ongoing search for
linguistic universals, seemingly lies outside the useful domain of law and
linguistics.
This assumption is demonstrably wrong. To the extent that we legal
writers might believe otherwise, we have only ourselves to blame. We have
been misunderstanding the relation between law and linguistics all along. 4
II. THE REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST:
OF THE DREAMER AND THE SCHEMER
Thanks to the Law and Linguistics Consortium, we are witnessing the
emergence of a scholarship that subjects law to explicitly linguistic
analysis. But the law has already been trying to reconcile itself with
linguistic teachings for some time. Legal thinkers have constantly sought
the elusive balance between the priest and the practitioner, between the
dreamer and the schemer. It should come as no surprise that Clark
Cunningham began his teaching career as a clinical instructor and continues
to dramatize real legal stories in his scholarship.' What is surprising is
the gap between the linguistic analysis that the legal academy hypothetical-
ly prefers and the linguistic analysis that the judiciary actually performs.
Especially in the fields of statutory interpretation and constitutional law,
morphology and phonology on a "continuum of complexity" that ranges from the more complex and
less structured to the less complex and more structured).
22. But see Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991) (arguing, in effect, that
antidiscrinination law should protect individuals whose cultural backgrounds impair their phonological
performance).
23. But see, e.g., Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535-42 (1991) (interpreting the
French "authentic text" of the Warsaw Convention); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397400 (1985)
(same); Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients, supra note 6, at 2463-65 (discussing the problems raised
when the English word guilty is translated as culpable in Spanish); cf Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012,
1016 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (analyzing the Latinate etymology of the word confront in support of a "literal"
interpretation of the constitutional right of "the accused... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him'
24. See generally RicARD A. PosNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION
209-68 (1988) (documenting objections to the use of literary criticism in the interpretation of legal
texts).
25. See Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, supra note 6, at 1298 ("This is a true story.");
Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients, supra note 6, at 2459 (same).
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legal scholars have plunged headlong into the linguistic subdiscipline of
pragmatics.26 Much of this scholarship is overtly embarrassed by the law's
tepid intellectual reputation; its authors seem subconsciously motivated by
Ph.D. envy. Many a post-collegiate path to a legal professorship covers less
than half the time between the Graduate Record Exam and the dissertation
defense. Only in law do the professors teach the classes and the students
edit the journals;" the opposite is true throughout the rest of the acade-
my.2" At the other extreme, the "new textualism" of the Rehnquist Court
has cloaked itself in a shroud of quasi-scientific linguistic-analysis, seeking
semantic shelter among lexicographic islands in a sea of uncertainty.29
Armed with ad hoc linguistic reasoning and its choice of dictionaries,"0
the new textualism suggests that exclusive reliance on "the ordinary
meaning of [statutory] language in its textual context" and the "established
canons of construction" will shield judges from the pernicious influences
of pragmatism and contextually contingent interpretation."
26. See, e.g., RONALD DwoRKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of
Desire: Hermeneutics and the Autonomous Legal Text, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1065 (1993); Ronald
Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 527 (1982); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1990); Francis J. Mootz mI, The
Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of
Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. REV. 523 (1988); Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and
the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance and Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L.
REv 335 (1988).
27. See Christopher Shea, Students v. Professors: Law-Review Debate Heats Up as Student Editors
Clash with Faculty Authors, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 2, 1995, at A33. See generally Symposium
on Law Review Editing: The Struggle Between Author and Editor Over Control of the Text, 70 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 69 (1994); Special Issue: Law Review Conference, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1117 (1995).
28. Cf., e.g., JANE SMILEY, Moo 245 (1995) ("As usual, his exams would be given out by his
graduate assistants and graded by the university computer. Those grades would then be... tallied
according to a statistical curve, and reported to the students. By then, Dr. Lionel Gift would have been
in Costa Rica for over a week. Let it snow let it snow let is snow: He would not be here to see it, and
that suited him perfectly.').
29. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
30. Compare MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 114 S. Ct. 2223,2230
n.3 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (snubbing the definition of "modify" in WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1452 (1976) because of that dictionary's "portrayal of common error as proper usage")
with, eg., Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 112 S. Ct. 2447, 2453, 2455
(1992) (Scalia, J.) (citing Webster's Third without fanfare); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624
(1991) (Scalia, J.) (same). See also National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798,
804 (1994) (citing Webster's Third before MCI); Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2239,
2245 (1994) (citing Webster's Third after MCI). See generally Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and
Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1439 n.12 (1994) (stating that the Supreme Court
cited Webster's Third more often than any other general-use dictionary between October Terms 1988
and 1992).
31. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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With so wide a gap, no wonder legal scholarship can neither satisfy the
needs of practicing lawyers nor generate novel ideas for their own sake.32
Granted, it is no small task to reconcile the contradictory tendencies of the
hermeneutical hermit and the tome-thumping textualist. Solon of Athens
gave wise laws;33 Solan of America has given wise advice. Neither a
minstrel nor a scrivener be.34 Though also stricken by Ph.D. envy, I write
in hopes of finding an alternative to the two dreary extremes presented by
prevalent legal treatments of linguistic concepts. The inherent unreliability
of dictionaries35 and the Supreme Court's shameless dictionary-shop-
ping 6 undermine the new textualism's claim to coherence. On the other
hand, the academic response to the new textualism has often assumed the
posture of the deconstructionist, arrogant in her belief that she can
dismantle any text. But if "[t]he Justices have not been reading their
Derrida," 37 why should we?3" Why must we speak as though a quest for
meaning will surely fail, as though the application of linguistics to law will
necessarily obliterate any hope of finding an interpretive anchor?39 "Ay,
there's the rub."4 Deconstructionist hermeneutics notwithstanding, modem
linguistics offers scant support to critical theories so corrosive that they
consume themselves." What would happen if we described the legal
32. See Daniel A. Farber, Missing the "Play oflntelligence," 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 147-
48 (1994).
33. See generally PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF THE NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANs 97-117 (John
Dryden trans., Arthur Hugh Clough rev. ed. 1979) (describing the life of Solon, a celebrated Athenian
legislator).
34. Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMILET act 1, sc. 3, 1. 75 (Riverside ed., 1974) ("Neither a
borrower nor a lender be") [hereinafter HAMLET]; cf. also Cunningham et al., supra note 2, at 1565
(declining to "address the[] difficult jurisprudential issues" raised by "the scholarly attention devoted
to new textualism").
35. See id. at 1614-16; Solan, When Judges Use the Dictionary, supra note 3.
36. See Note, supra note 30.
37. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning,
1990 Sup. Cr. REv. 231, 231.
38. Ignore, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, LA VoIX ET LE PHtNOMtNE: INTRODUCTION AU PROBLtME
DU SIGNE DANS LA PHtNOMtNOLOGIE DE HUSSERL (1993).
39. Cf. Law and Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 785, 882 (1995) (statement of William
N. Eskridge, Jr.) (acknowledging that none of the participants in the Law and Linguistics Conference
writes in the deconstructive style of critical theory); id. at 884 (statement of Michael Moore) ("I actually
think the discipline of law, fortunately, is not so permeated with followers of Habermas, Derrida,
Gadamer et al.[,] and I actually think it's a passing phase .... ).
40. HAMLET, supra note 34, act 3, sc. 1, 1. 64.
41. Cf Chen & Gifford, supra note 15, at 1317 (suggesting that law and economics in its most
rabid manifestations exhibits this tendency); Jim Chen, The Constitutional Law Songbook, 11 CONST.
COMMENTARY 263, 264 (1994) (offering "The Coasean Creed" as an anthem for the Critical Legal
Studies version of law and economics).
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process and the legal academy in more honest linguistic terms? We might
discover that law without linguistics is but a naked abstraction, like the
painting of a sorrow, a face without a heart.42
Ill. LOST IN TRANSLATION
A. Innocents Abroad
James Boyd White43 and Clark Cunningham' have offered a felicitous
metaphor that helps us begin to clarify the proper relationship between law
and linguistics. They describe law as translation, as the rendering of
ordinary, nonlegal language into the patois of the legal system. For
Cunningham, effective legal representation presents the ultimate challenge
to the lawyer as translator: "The translator does not silence the speaker but
rather seeks to enhance the speaker's voice by adding her own ... and may
even collaborate with the speaker to produce a statement in the foreign
language that is more meaningful than the speaker's original utterance."'45
The good lawyer speaks both the language of the law and the language of
the people.
Translation in the sense of traversing linguistic barriers fits the
representational setting well enough. As fewer legally trained professionals
represent actual clients, however, the translation metaphor may prove too
narrow to capture the fuller senses in which we "learn" or "do" law.
Lawrence Lessig's sense of "translation" extends the metaphor to the
interpretive setting,4 6 albeit at the price of implicitly taking sides in the
debate over whether judges are properly seen as agents of the legislature.47
Furthermore, although White, Cunningham, and Lessig properly envision
translation as a rich, complete experience, the term "translation" carries
with it the baggage of generations of bad foreign language instruction. As
42. HAMLET, supra note 34, act 4, sc. 7, 11. 108-09.
43. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL
CRITICISM (1990); James Boyd White, Translation as a Mode of Thought, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1388
(1992); cf. James Boyd White, Book Review, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature?, 102 HARv.
L REv. 2014, 2023 (1989) (arguing that a literary awareness helps law and lawyers imagine other
worlds, much as a translator exposes one culture's literature to another).
44. See Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, supra note 6; Cunningham, A Tale of Two
Clients, supra note 6, at 2482-85.
45. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, supra note 6, at 1300.
46. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
47. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405, 415-41 (1989).
1995] 1269
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any student of foreign language has discovered, transplanting native
semantics or syntax into a foreign setting will almost surely cause
trouble.48 Indeed, "translation" in the rigid sense of textual manipulation
comes perilously close to the constitutional catechism that animates the new
textualism and its formalist cousins. 49 At its most extreme, formalist
dogma posits that identifying all of the "established" canons of interpreta-
tion and subjecting them to brute Euclidean logic will yield one and only
one answer to every legal problem." Learning or "doing" law in this
fashion is as likely to succeed as painstaking analysis of the Gallic
Commentaries, the Iliad, or Hrafnkels saga freysg6ea is likely to prepare
the "translator" for daily life in modem Italy, Greece, or Iceland." The
living law does not and should not resemble the paleolinguistic exercise of
excavating ancient texts so that today's scholars can project modem
readings onto them. 2
48. Inquire, for instance, about prdservatifs in a French pastry shop, and you will probably
communicate an interest in something besides French baking secrets. The "translation" problem exists
even between the United States and the United Kingdom, two nations separated by a common language.
Thus, a Briton who asks her American host to "knock me up" at a chosen hour in the morning might
be getting more than she bargained for.
49. See George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism ofAntonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1320
(1990) (describing this formula, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with the Law, and
the Word was Law"--which is a blasphemous transformation of John 1:1-as "the short and simple
recipe for a catechetical Constitution').
50. Cf Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 GEo. LJ. 217, 226 (1994) (framing the quest for legal truth as one powered solely by the
force of "Euclidean" logic); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to
Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. LJ. 347, 368, 371 (1994) (criticizing Paulsen's geometric technique);
Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and Practice: Two Questions for Michael
Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 83 GEO. LJ. 373, 378 (1994) (same).
51. Which is not to say that lawyers have nothing to learn from these classics. Compare, e.g.,
JULIUS CAESAR, CoMMENTARII CUM A. HIRTI ALIORUMQUE SUPPLEMENTIS RECOGNOVIT BERNARDUS
DINTER 1 (1890) ("Gallia est omnia divisa en partes tres.") with Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,
347 U.S. 672, 691 (1954) (Clark, J., dissenting) ("The natural gas industry, like ancient Gaul, is divided
into three parts. These parts are production and gathering, interstate transmission by pipeline, and
distribution to consumers by local distribution companies."). See also, e.g., THEODORE M. ANDERSSON
& WILLIAM IAN MILLER, LAW AND LITERATURE IN MEDIEVAL ICELAND: L16sVETNINGA SAGA AND
VALLA-LJ6TS SAGA (1989); DAVID COHEN, LAW, SEXUALITY, AND SOCIETY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF
MORALS IN CLASSICAL ATHENS (1991); WILLIAM IAN MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING:
FEUD, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN SAGA ICELAND (1990); Henry Ordower, Exploring the Literary Function
of Law and Litigation in Njal's Saga, 3 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 41 (1991); cf Richard A. Posner,
Book Review, Medieval Iceland and Modern Legal Scholarship, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1495, 1506-07
(1992) (comparing saga Iceland as a legal society with classical Athens and Homeric Greece).
52. Cf, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-93 (1985)
(urging judges interpreting statutes to engage in "imaginative reconstruction" of the enacting
legislature's intent); Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381 (1907)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss3/28
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In the end, "translation" is an incomplete metaphor for the law as a
system of language, for it presupposes not only the existence of multiple
languages in law, but also the process by which lawyers attain their talent
as polyglots. Neither premise is necessarily wrong-in fact, I shall defend
them both in due time-but one cannot assess the artistry of an American
translation of Moli~re's Le Misanthrope without an underlying understand-
ing of both French and English. Moreover, the bad image of translation
compounds the law's archaeological perception of language, the law's
stupefying obsession with la langue litt6raire at the expense of la parole
as the dynamic engine of linguistic evolution.53
Most errors by lawyers as amateur linguists can be traced to the
assumption that language is a static mechanism rather than a living
organism. The law looks to plain language techniques as though linguistic
analysis were prescriptive rather than descriptive. In criticizing Webster's
Third New International Dictionary for "its portrayal of common error as
proper usage,"54 Justice Antonin Scalia expressed the classic lawyerly
misperception of linguistics. To a linguist, "common error" is "proper
usage." By contrast, verbal etiquette is the domain of lawyers, literary
critics, and various other self-appointed guardians of manners and customs.
The instinctive legal reaction to linguists and linguistics---"What have you
guys got against dictionaries?"-shows how far the legal world is from
understanding how linguists "can give us more reliable information about
the meanings of words."55 Dictionaries offer at best an imperfect measure
of an "individual 6tat de langue," of language "as a closed totality" to be
analyzed solely for the "functions between its parts. 5 6 And a minute
portion of the itat de langue at that: dictionaries rarely, if ever, provide
useful information on syntax. The shortcoming is often critical; even when
everyone agrees over the definition of knowingly, there may be sharp
disagreement over whether the word modifies specific statutory terms.57
(defending an approach essentially identical to Posner's technique of imaginative reconstruction by
identifying the pitfalls of the "spurious" alternative).
53. Compare SAussuRE, supra note 19, at 45-47 (discussing the illusory prestige of written
language over spoken language) with id. at 36-39 (discussing the way in which daily speech modifies
linguistic conventions over time).
54. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 114 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 n.3
(1994).
55. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 39, at 823 (statement of Charles Fillmore).
56. Louis HJELMSLEV, LANGUAGE: AN INTRODUCTION 8 (Francis J. Whitfield trans., 1970).
57. See generally SOLAN, supra note 3, at 95-98 (distinguishing between "structural ambiguity"
and "problems of categorization" as major causes of statutory ambiguity); Cunningham et al., supra note
2, at 1573-77 (discussing United States v. Staples, 972 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct.
1995] 1271
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Let us modify rather than abandon the translation metaphor.58 Perhaps
it is more fruitful to ask how one masters any language, much less the
language of the law. For the professional linguist, "the chief problem...
will always be, not the individual 6tat de langue, but the relationship
between different stages of a single language and between different
languages, their similarities and their differences." '59 Given enough
information, the comparative linguist might begin to identify "typological
relationships" between languages, relationships "based on an agreement in
structural features that is conditioned by the general possibilities of
language."60 Stated at this most general level, the search for linguistic
universals-nothing less than a quest for the universal grammar that makes
language possible6l1-parallels what Lon Fuller described as the ultimate
goal of jurisprudence, the search for "the morality that makes law
possible."'62
B. The Origin of Speech
The judicial obsession with lexicographic snapshots of language grows
out of an uninformed or at best obsolete view of linguistics. So does the
overwhelming academic preference for language philosophy over a more
scientific approach to linguistics. As we stand on the brink of a century
whose principal intellectual project may consist of overthrowing the
Standard Social Science Model,63 we should acknowledge the brooding
omnipresence of B.F. Skinner. For Skinner, language was just another
expression of behaviorialist psychology: environmental stimuli in,
1793 (1994)). See also, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994) (analyzing
the range of the statutory adverb knowingly); cf Ratzlaf. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994)
(analyzing the range of the statutory adverb willfully).
58. Cf MCI Telecommunications, 114 S. Ct. at 2229 (holding that modify means "to change
moderately or in minor fashion").
59. HJELMSLEV, supra note 56, at 9.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX 28 (1965) ("The study of
linguistic universals is the study of the properties of any generative grammar for a natural language.');
HELEN GOODLUCK, LANGUAGE AcQuisroN: A LiNGUtsTIc INTRODUCTION §§ 1.4, 4.1-4.1.5, at 3-4,
61-74 (1991).
62. LON FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAW 33 (rev. ed. 1969).
63. See generally THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF
CULTURE (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter THE ADAPTED MIND]; D.E. BROWN, HUMAN
UNIVERSALS (1991); CARL N. DEGNER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE: THE DECLINE AND REVIVAL
OF DARWINISM IN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1991). The incipient, largely Darwinian uprising
against social science dogma may eventually rival the scope of the battle that western science has
waged against Aristotle since the Renaissance.
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conditioned responses out.64 At its most extreme, Skinner's theory claimed
that experimental work on nonhuman psychology could "be extended to
human [verbal] behavior without serious modification."' 5 Two of the
preeminent language philosophers of Skinner's time, W.V.O. Quine and
Ludwig Wittgenstein, depicted language acquisition in terms that were
essentially indistinguishable from Skinner's theory. Quine explicitly
adopted Skinner's behaviorialist model, arguing that some societal reward,
even as modest as "corroborative usage" of language bearing some
"resemblance to the child's effort," provided the needed stimulus and
reinforcement to help a child attain language competency.66 Wittgenstein
credited explicit drill-and-repetition linguistic instruction,67 even though
this training technique has created no fluency in Latin in the modem era.
The American legal academy might justify its predilection for language
philosophers such as Quine and Wittgenstein as a part of a grander effort
to understand pragmatic constraints on legal language. As shown by
William Eskridge's explanation68 of Francis Lieber's "fetch some
soupmeat" hypothetical,69 hermeneutics has enhanced the law's under-
standing of the myriad ways in which context might affect the legal
interpretation. Generational differences in intellectual tastes offer a less
charitable but nevertheless inoffensive explanation for the contemporary
focus on Quine and Wittgenstein. Between 1956 and 1966, there was at
least one future Supreme Court Justice among Harvard Law School
students. Those students-Ruth Bader Ginsburg (class of 1959, transferred
to Columbia before the 1958-59 school year), Antonin Scalia ('60),
Anthony Kennedy ('61), Stephen Breyer ('64), and David Souter
64. See B.F. SKINNER, VERBAL BEHAVIOR (1957).
65. Id. at 5.
66. WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 82-83 (1960).
67. See LUDWIG WITrGENsTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 9, at 5-6 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans 1953); cf id. § 23, at 11-12 (describing speech as "Sprachspiel," a "language-game' that can be
learned and mastered like any other form of entertainment (emphasis in original)). See generally W.F.
Day, On Certain Similarities between the Philosophical Investigations of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the
Operationism of B.F. Skinner, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAVIOR 489 (1969).
68. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORYINTERPRETATION40,5356-57,125-28,
246-47 (1994); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRIcKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 604-06 (2d ed. 1995); Law and
Linguistics Conference, supra note 39, at 940-53.
69. See FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEuTICS 17-20 (2d ed. 1880), reprinted
in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1114-15 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds. 1994).
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('66)-constitute a majority on today's Court.7" These future Justices
attended Harvard during the golden age of the "legal process" school; all
five took Henry Hart and Albert Sacks's legal process class.7' These
Justices' law school contemporaries enjoy a commanding grip on today's
judiciary and legal academy. It is altogether understandable that today's
legal leaders might favor the language philosophers who dominated the
intellectual scene during their formative educational years.
This period, however, happened to be a tumultuous one for linguistics.
Two generations earlier, in 1921, Edward Sapir's Language72 had inspired
young Louis Hjelmslev to envision "the possibility of establishing a
comparative general linguistics destined to supersede the subjective and
sentimental philosophy of language of the past."'73 In the crucial decade
between 1956 and 1966, Noam Chomsky fulfilled Hjelmslev's prophecy.
As Consortium member Judith Levi has acknowledged, Chomsky
"transformed linguistics as a discipline" by "tum[ing] linguistics into a
theory[-]building enterprise [with] rigorous expectations. '7 4 In 1957, the
same year in which Skinner's Verbal Behavior appeared, Chomsky
published Syntactic Structures, his earliest effort at sketching the outline of
a generative grammar.7' This event marked a scientific "turning point" in
linguistics.76 When Chomsky published his devastating 1959 review of
Skinner's book,7 contemporary linguistics witnessed a cosmic collision,
70. See Nancy Waring, Stephen Breyer: A Look Back at Law School, 46 HARV. L. BULL. 4, 8
(1995) (a list of Supreme Court Justices who studied at Harvard Law School). This period's influence
thus rivals and may eventually eclipse the influence exerted by the Harvard Law School of the 1930s,
when Harry Blacknun (class of '32), William Brennan ('31), and Lewis Powell (LL.M. '32) studied
there, Felix Frankfurter taught there, and Erwin Griswold lobbied forcefully against President
Roosevelt's Court-packing plan.
71. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107
HARv. L. REV. 2031, 2047 (1994).
72. See EDWARD SAPIR, LANGUAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF SPEECH (1921).
73. Louis Hjelmslev, Edward Sapir, 1 ACTA LINGuISTiCA 76, 77 (1939).
74. Law andLinguistics Conference, supra note 39, at 899. This intellectual revolution apparently
took hold among linguists during the 1960s and 1970s, see id., and thus may have postdated the height
of the legal process era in legal education. By now, the nonlegal intellectual consensus is clear: the Arts
and Humanities Citation Index ranks Chomsky as the most cited living person and the eighth of all
time. See Carlos P. Otero, Foreword, in I NOAM CHOMSKY: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS xxi, xXii (Carlos
P. Otero ed. 1994); Kim Vandiver, MlT Tech Talk (April 15, 1992) (university newsletter).
75. See NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES (1957).
76. DAVID CRYSTAL, THE CAMBIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGE § 65, at 409 (1987).
77. See Noam Chomsky, Book Review, A Review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior, 35
LANGUAGE 26 (1959), reprinted in THE STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE 547 (Jerry A. Fodor & Jerrold J.
Katz ed., 1964).
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perhaps one of paradigmatic dimensions.8 Skinner had portrayed language
as a two-pronged, stimulus-response machine; if linguists could identify all
of the admittedly large number of relevant social stimuli, they could
explain and predict speech as a conditioned response. Far from satisfying
what Chomsky would later clarify as "explanatory adequacy" in linguistic
theory,79 Skinner's model represented for Chomsky "a kind of measure of
the importance of the factors omitted from consideration," "an indication
of how little is really known about [the] remarkably complex phenomenon"
of language.8" The fault lay, according to Chomsky, in Skinner's apparent
belief "that the contribution of the speaker is quite trivial and elementa-
r-y. "
81
Whereas Skinner had emphasized the predictability of language as a
psychological phenomenon, Chomsky's opposing view stressed linguistic
creativity, "the capacity that all native speakers of a language have to
produce and understand an indefinitely large number of sentences that they
have never heard before and that may indeed never have been uttered
before."82 The distinction is crucial. How speakers respond to social
conditioning explains precious little; what speakers actually do despite the
absence of rigorous training comprises the mystery and the magic of
language at their fullest. The authors of Plain Meaning and Hard Cases
restated this proposition quite ably: "The very flexibility of language...
is possible precisely because the range of meaning of a word or sentence
cannot be limited in advance by prescription but rather is realized in the
creativity of actual use."83
From the Chomskyan perspective, the child's "remarkable capacity for
learning typifies this creative aspect of language."84 "[W]ithout any
explicit instruction," the young child gains "perfect mastery of a language
with incomparably greater ease" than even the most rigorously trained
78. See Robert Freidin, Conceptual Shifts in the Science of Grammar: 1951-92, in I NOAM
CHOMSKY: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS, supra note 74, at 653; Jerrold J. Katz & Thomas G. Bever, The
Fall and Rise of Empiricism, in AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF LINGUISTIC ABILrrY 11 (Thomas G. Bever
et al. eds, 1976), reprinted in I NOAM CHOMSKY: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS, supra note 74, at 286. See
generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFc REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
79. See CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX, supra note 61, at 25-26; Noam
Chomsky, Current Issues in Linguistic Theory, in THE STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE, supra note 77, at
50, 63.
80. Chomsky, supra note 77, at 28.
81. Id, (emphasis added).
82 JOHN LYONS, NOAM CHOMSKY 21 (1970).
83. Cunningham et al., supra note 2, at 1616.
84. Chomsky, Book Review, supra note 77, at 43.
1995] 1275
Washington University Open Scholarship
1276 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
adults.85 "Mere exposure to ... language[] for a remarkably short
period"8 6 permits the child to acquire the entire "system of linguistic
competence that underlies behavior."87 Universal grammar, or UG, is
intrinsic to the speaker. By contrast, the much-vaunted environmental
influences of Skinner's behavioralism merely channel the child's linguistic
instincts toward a single, underlying set of phonological, semantic, and
syntactic rules.88 The nature of UG points to a biological and uniquely
human wellspring for the gift of language: the likely absence of any
"structure similar to UG in nonhuman organisms" means that "the capacity
for free, appropriate, and creative use of language as an expression of
thought" is almost surely "a distinctive feature of the human species."8 9
Even a cursory survey reveals some of the broader implications of the
Chomskyan revolution 0 for linguistic analysis of law. As an initial matter,
an acknowledgement of Chomsky's contributions should cool off the legal
academy's torrid love affair with Quine and Wittgenstein. These language
philosophers have provided useful word games,91 but their views on the
origins of language are suspect. Wittgenstein's "examples and remarks,
often brilliant and perceptive, lead right to the border of the deepest
problems, at which point he stops short and insists that the philosopher can
85. Noam Chomsky, Explanatory Models in Linguistics, in LoGIC, METHODOLOGY AND
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 528, 529 (Ernst Nagel et al. eds., 1962).
86. Id.
87. NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MIND 4 (enlarged ed. 1972).
88. Studies of how children acquire different languages suggest that children rapidly adjust to the
dominant syntax of the language they are learning. See, e.g., Barbara Lust, Conjunction Reduction In
Child Language, 4 J. CHILD LANGUAGE 257 (1977) (English); Barbara Lust & Yu-Chen Chien, The
Structure of Coordination in First-Language Acquisition of Mandarin Chinese: Evidence for a
Universal, 17 COGNITION 49 (1984); Barbara Lust & Tatsuko Wakayama, The Structure of
Coordination in Children's First-Language Acquisition ofJapanese, in STUDIES IN FIRST-AND SECOND-
LANGUAGE ACQUISITION (F. Eckman & A. Hastings eds., 1979); cf H. Clahsen & Pieter Muysken, The
Availability of Universal Grammar to Adult and Child Learners: A Study of the Acquisition of German
Word Order, 2 SECOND LANGUAGE RES. 93 (1986).
89. NOAM CHOMsKY, REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE 40 (1975); see also NOAM CHOMSKY,
CARTESIAN LINGUISTICS: A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF RATIONALIST THOUGHT 4-5 (1966) ("[M]an
has a species-specific capacity, a unique type of intellectual organization which cannot be attributed to
peripheral organs or related to general intelligence and which manifests itself in what we may refer to
as the 'creative aspect' of ordinary language use .... ").
90. See generally Frederick J. Newmeyer, Has There Been a 'Chomskyan Revolution' In
Linguistics?, 62 LANGUAGE 1 (1986), reprinted in 2 NOAM CHOMSKY: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS, supra
note 74, at 919.
91. See SoLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES, supra note 3, at 96 (identifying Wittgenstein's
problem of a "game" that should be taught to children, see WrrTGENSTEIN, supra note 67, §§ 66-75,
at 31-35, and Quine's discussion of the appropriate definition of a "mountain," see QUINE, supra note
66, at 126).
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go no further." 92 For his part, Quine rejected transformational grammar
and other efforts to find a universal grammar as "folly," bound to be
"stifle[d]" by "[t]imely reflection on method and evidence."93 Adhering
to his view that the "indeterminacy of translation" imposes insurmountable
pragmatic constraints on language,94 Quine insisted as late as 1974 that
"the child learns most of language by hearing the adults and emulating
them,"95 even as his scientific contemporaries continued to document the
extraordinary extent of the human child's linguistic instincts.96
Quine's empiricism appeals to legal scholars' overwhelming preference
for the Standard Social Science Model, for the view that human beings are
strictly the products of social conditioning. 97 But ever since nineteenth-
century pioneers such as Rasmus Rask and Franz Bopp began identifying
genetic relationships among Indo-European languages,98 it has been
possible to think of language in biological terms and to study language
acquisition and linguistic change as biological processes. Today's linguists
are unearthing even more dramatic linkages between reproductive
92. Noam Chomsky, Some Empirical Assumptions in the Modern Philosophy of Language, in
PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ERNST NAGEL 260, 280 (Sidney
Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes & Morton White eds., 1969).
93. W.V. Quine, Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory, in SEMANTICS OF
NATURAL LANGUAGE 442, 447 (Gilbert Harman & Donald Davidson eds., 1972).
94. See W.V. QUINE, THE ROOTS OF REFERENCE 82-84 (1974); QUINE, supra note 66, at 27, 54,
72-79, 206, 221.
95. QUINE, THE ROOTS OF REFERENCE, supra note 94, at 46.
96. See, e.g., ROMAN JAKOBSON, STUDIES ON CHILD LANGUAGE AND APHASIA 7-29 (1971); cf.
CAROL CHOMSKY, THE ACQUISITION OF SYNTAX IN CHILDREN FROM 5 TO 10, at 121 (1969)
(concluding that "active syntactic acquisition" takes place in children up to the age of 9). Roman
Jakobson had been arguing for three decades that cross-linguistically common sounds, such as front
voiceless stops and nasals were the first sounds acquired by infants and the last sounds lost by aphasics.
See ROMAN JAKOBSON, CHILD LANGUAGE, APHASIA, AND PHONOLOGICAL UNIVERSALS 13-45 (1941);
Roman Jakobson, Two Aspects ofLanguage and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances, in FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF LANGUAGE 53 (Roman Jakobson & Morris Halle ed., 1956). See generally ANTOINE GRtGOIRE,
L'APPRENTISSAGE DU LANGUAGE (1937).
97. See, e.g., QuiNE, THE ROOTS OF REFERENCE, supra note 94, at 84:
The child learns [native syntax] by somehow getting a tentative and faulty command of a
couple of its component devices, through imitation or analogy perhaps, and then correcting
one against the other, and both against the continuing barrage of adult precept and example,
and going on in this way until he has a working system meeting social standards.
98. See RASMUS RASK, VEILEDNING TIL DET ISLANDSKE ELLER GAMLE NORDISKE SPROG (1818)
("Investigation into the Origin of the Icelandic or Old Norse Language"); FRANZ BOPP, ON THE
CONJUGATION SYSTEM OF THE SANSKRIT LANGUAGE, IN COMPARISON WITH THOSE OF THE GREEK,
LATIN. PERSIAN AND GERMANIC LANGUAGES (1816).
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communities and speech communities.99 Chomsky's work confirmed what
the ideology of modem social science had resisted for more than a century:
linguistic dynamics are biologically driven. The "fragmentary evidence" of
language that adults give to children, that all humans amass throughout
their lifetimes, "hopelessly underdetermines" the "rich and complex
construction" of each speaker's language capacity.0" Something innate
is at work.' °1
Let there be no doubt. After Chomsky, linguistic science portrays human
language as "a true species property," an element of the "biological
endowment" unique to Homo sapiens." Steven Pinker has flatly articu-
lated the Darwinian implications that Chomsky himself denies:'0" the
power of speech is "an evolutionary adaptation," and "human language is
a part of human biology."' 4 Arguably, "the ability to use a natural
language belongs more to the study of human biology than human culture;
it is a topic like echolocation in bats or stereopsis in monkeys, not like
writing or the wheel.""' 5 For an intellectual community that prefers a
sharp division between nature and culture' 6 and unflinchingly assigns
law to the latter realm, linguistics casts a long, profoundly disturbing
Darwinian shadow across the law. The Fourteenth Amendment may not
have enacted Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,"7 but the structure of the
language by which we make and debate law is "sharply limited" by the
99. See, e.g., Luigi L. Cavalli-Szorfa, Genes, Peoples and Languages, 265 Sc. AM. 104 (1991);
Luigi L. Cavalli-Szorfa et al., Reconstruction of Human Evolution: Bringing Together Genetic,
Archaeological, and Linguistic Data, 85 PROc. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. 6002 (1988). So it turns out that
people who talk together sleep together. How shocking. In a Darwinian world, there are two and only
two forces that matter. One of them is food. The other is sex. Language is how most of us get both.
100. CHOMSKY, REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE, supra note 89, at 10. For Chomsky's full response
to Quine's "indeterminacy of translation" hypothesis, see id. at 179-204.
101. See NOAM CHOMSKY, LEcruRES ON GOVERNMENT AND BINDING: THE PISA LECTURES 3 (5th
ed. 1988) [hereinafter CHOMSKY, LECTURES ON GOVERNMENT AND BINDING] ("[I]t is a near certainty
that fundamental properties of ... attained grammars are radically underdetermined by evidence
available to the language learner and must therefore be attributed to UG itself.").
102. NOAM CHOMSKY, KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE: ITS NATURE, ORIGIN, AND USE xxvi (1986)
[hereinafter CHOMSKY, KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE].
103. See CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MIND, supra note 87, at 97-98; NoAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE
AND PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE: THE MANAGUA LEcruREs 167 (1988).
104. STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 24 (1994).
105. Steven Pinker & Paul Bloom, Natural Langauge and Natural Selection, in THE ADAPTED
MIND, supra note 63, at 451.
106. See generally, e.g., ALAIN, L'HoMME ET L'ANIMAL (1962) (distinguishing sharply between
bestial "nature" and human "culture").
107. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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biological constraints of universal grammar."'
IV. LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LEARNING
So it appears that our linguistic ship atop the sea of legal indeterminacy
is the Beagle."9 But where will it take us? If not to new lands, then
toward new ways of seeing familiar terrain. The existence of universal
grammar reinforces the discovery of universals in other language-based
disciplines. For instance, Joseph Campbell's classic study, The Hero with
a Thousand Faces, showed how heroic myths from diverse cultural and
religious traditions nevertheless converged."' So it may be with law. If
there is a "universal grammar" that binds the law, however, we are unlikely
to find it through the crude methodology of the new textualism. Law is a
language, but not a natural one. Law has its audiences, but not necessarily
the same ones as the "speech communities" known to linguists. There may
be a universal legal grammar; if so, it probably incorporates nonlinguistic
constraints on judicial decisionmaking. Such are the peculiarities of law as
a species of language acquisition.
A. The Unholy Trinity of the Interpretive World
The unthinking observer may assume that a search for legal universals
will redound to the benefit of the new textualism. True, there is a sense in
which "the empirical investigation of testable hypotheses" by linguists may
lend greater credibility to the textualist search "for some 'objective' word
meaning that cannot be circumvented by willful judges."'1 But there is
something primitive, something pre-Chomskyan about the architecture of
an unsophisticated "plain meaning" approach to statutory interpretation. To
the extent that plain meaning approaches are attempting to follow the
intellectual path blazed by the pioneers of linguistic universals, the new
textualists sound a wee bit aphasic.
In the spirit of an eclectic but integrative jurisprudence that binds
together all approaches toward understanding language,'12 I shall enlist
108. CHOMSKY, REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE, supra note 89, at 10.
109. Cf generally CHARLES DARWIN, JOURNAL OF REsEARcHEs INTO THE NATURAL HISTORY AND
GEOLOGY OF THE COUNTRIES VISITED DURING THE VOYAGE OF H.M.S. BEAGLE ROUND THE WORLD
(1839).
110. See JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE HERO WTrH A THOUSAND FACES (2d ed. 1968).
l11. Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1085, 1085-86 (1995).
112. See generally Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality,
History, 76 CAL. L. REv. 779 (1988). In "religion, literature, and law" alike, a canonical text "takes on
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the help of the late Walker Percy. In addition to being a novelist and a
Christian existentialist, Percy cultivated a lifelong interest in linguistics. In
1975, he published The Message in the Bottle," a collection of essays
on linguistics. Published before Chomsky delivered his landmark lectures
on government and binding,"4 Percy's essays provide the insights of an
informed but nonexpert observer of linguistics in the crucial period between
1954 and 1975. Although "descriptively inadequate" as a theory of
language acquisition, Percy's philosophy had the inadvertent virtue of being
"empirically indistinguishable from Chomsky's.""' 5 Finally, his status as
an outsider emulates that of the lawyer interested in linguistics or, indeed,
that of the linguist interested in explaining her craft to a nonlinguist. Just
as Consortium member Georgia Green explains pragmatics from the
perspective of an Australian aborigine who is trying to learn English,
t
"
6
a perpetual quality" and leaves its interpreters "no easy... recourse to further instructions." Frickey,
supra note 111, at 1093; cf CRYSTAL, supra note 76, § 63, at 384-87 (discussing the special
characteristics of religious and legal language). In light of the links between these language-based
enterprises, it is a damn shame that "most legal scholars are not very interested in" "biblical
interpretation" Law and Linguistis Conference, supra note 39, at 831 (statement of Kent Greenawalt);
cf. HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION ix (1993)
(arguing that "the legal order of a society ... is intrinsically connected ... with religious faith" in spite
of a hostile "academic world" that "see[s] only a remote connection between legal institutions and
religious beliefs").
113. WALKER PERCY, THE MESSAGE IN THE BOTTLE: HOW QUEER MAN Is, HOW QUEER
LANGUAGE IS, AND WHAT ONE HAS TO Do WITH THE OTHER (1975) [hereinafter PERCY, THE MESSAGE
IN THE BOTTLE].
114. See CHOMSKY, LECTURES ON GOVERNMENT AND BINDING, supra note 101; Noam Chomsky,
Some Notes on Economy of Derivation and Representation, in PRINCIPLES AND PARAMETERS IN
COMPARATIVE GRAMMAR 417 (Robert Freidin ed., 1991), See generally Edwin Williams, Review
Article, 60 LANGUAGE 400 (1984) (reviewing, inter alia, the first edition of CHOMSKY, LECTURES ON
GOVERNMENT AND BINDING, supra note 101), reprinted in I NoAM CHOMSKY: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS,
supra note 74, at 453.
115. Frank Parker, Walker Percy's Theory of Language: A Linguist's Assessment, 13 DELTA 145,
146 (1981). On adequacy in linguistic theory, see generally CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF
SYNTAX, supra note 61, at 24-27; Chomsky, Current Issues in Linguistic Theory, supra note 79, at 62-
63. Curiously, Percy's literary critics characterized his view of language as a rejection of Chomskyan
theory. See Panthea Reid Broughton, A Bottle Unopened, A Message Unread, 52 VA. Q. REV. 155, 156-
57 (1976) (arguing that Percy's essays "go a long way... toward refuting (or at least undermining)
both Skinner and Chomsky'); William H. Poteat, Reflections on Walker Percy's Theory of Language:
Or, Is it Better to Stay with Helen Keller at the Well-House in Tuscumbia, Alabama, Than to Venture
to Mars and Be Devoured by the Ravening Particles, in THE ART OF WALKER PERCY: STRATAGEMS
FOR BEING 192, 215 (Panthea Reid Broughton ed., 1979) (describing Percy's work as "a potent
dialectical weapon against Chomsky, the transformationalists, the semioticists, and skinner').
116. See Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 39, at 840-41 (statement of Clark
Cunningham). See generally GEORGIA M. GREEN, PRAGMATICS AND NATURAL LANGUAGE
UNDERSTANDING (1989).
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Percy adopted the point of view of a "Martian making his first visit to
earth," amazed by the phenomenon of human speech."' 7
For our purposes, Percy's greatest contribution lies in his description of
speech as symbol manipulation. Like Susanne Langer before him, Percy
stressed "the universal symbolific function of the human mind."" 8
Inspired by the story of Helen Keller's remarkable breakthrough into
linguistic awareness, when the deaf and blind girl linked "the wonderful
cool something that was flowing over [one] hand" with the letters
"w-a-t-e-r" being formed in her other hand,"9 Percy asserted that "an
inkling of what happened in [that] well-house in Alabama" would teach us
,.more about the phenomenon of language... than is contained in all the
works of behaviorists, linguists, and German philosophers."' 20 Linking
both the object "water" and the symbol water with Helen, he portrayed the
event as an example of the "Delta phenomenon"-
Helen " Water (word)
Water (liquid)
Helen Keller and the Delta Phenomenon
Symbol, object, and interpreter: behold, the unholy trinity of the interpre-
117. WALKER PERCY, The Delta Factor: How I Discovered the Delta Factor Sitting at My Desk
One Summer Day in Louisiana in the 1950s Thinking About an Event in the Life of Helen Keller on
Another Summer Day in Alabama in 1887, in THE MESSAGE IN THE BOTTLE, supra note 113, at 3, 11
[hereinafter PERCY, The Delta Factor]; see also WALKER PERCY, A Theory of Language: A Martian
View of Linguistic Theory, Plus the Discovery That an Explanatory Theory Does Not Presently Exist,
Plus the Offering of a Crude Explanatory Model on the Theory That Something Is Better Than Nothing,
in THE MESSAGE IN THE BOTTLE, supra note 113, at 298-302 [hereinafter PERCY, A Theory of
Language]; cf Derrick Bell, Xerces and the Affirmative Action Mystique, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1595,
1598 (1989) (analyzing the American race problem through an imaginary dialogue with an
extraterrestrial named Xerces).
118. WALKER PERCY, Symbol as Need, in THE MESSAGE IN THE BOTTLE, supra note 113, at 289,
292 (reviewing SUSANNE K. LANGER, FEELING AND FORM (1953) and SUSANNE K. LANGER,
PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY (3d ed. 1957)).
119. HELEN KELLER, THE STORY OF My LIFE 23 (1905); cf (perhaps) PETE TOWNSHEND & DES
McANUFF, THE WHO'S TOMMY: THE MUSICAL (1993) ("That deaf, dumb, and blind kid sure plays a
mean pinball"),
120. PERCY, The Delta Factor, supra note 117, at 35-36.
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five world.' 2 ' This triangular, or "triadic," visualization of the language
function pervades Percy's essays on linguistics." Percy's triad links the
two Saussurian components of the linguistic sign-the conceptual signifig
and the acoustic signiftant'23-with the interpreter at the center of
Chomskyan linguistics. The triadic vision stands in stark contrast with the
bipolar stimulus-response model at the heart of Skinner's Verbal Behav-
ior.'24 By emphasizing the interpreter as the flexible human link between
symbolizing word and symbolized object, Percy's model of language
reverses Skinner's effort to minimize the role of the speaker. The triadic
construct concedes the irreducible role of human intuition in any putatively
objective test of grammar."n The Chomskyan influence is obvious and
inextricable.
It is a shame that B.F. Skinner did not become a lawyer; he would have
found himself surrounded by like thinkers who believed in their ability to
reduce the world to a series of stimuli and responses. Whether the social
sciences would have benefitted from his absence is less clear than the legal
philosophy he would have adopted. The jurisprudence, so to speak, of
behavioralist linguistics would have been positivism unmodified. 6 As
between Skinner's bipolar stimulus-response and Percy's pivoting triad, the
Skinnerian model is the one that befits The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules.27 The new textualism presupposes a strict one-to-one relationship
between symbol and object, between a statutory term and its "plain
121. Cf Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) ("It is a familiar
rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not
within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.').
122. See generally WALKER PERCY, Toward a Triadic Theory of Meaning, in THE MESSAGE IN THE
BOTTLE, supra note 113, at 159. What Percy called his "theory of language" is nothing more than a few
elaborations on this basic model. See PERCY, A Theory of Language, supra note 117, at 325, 327.
123. See SAUSSURE, supra note 19, at 99-100.
124. See PERCY, Toward a Triadic Theory of Meaning, supra note 122, at 162.
125. Consider the following statement by Law and Linguistics Conference participant Michael Geis:
Chomsky gave an argument in support of [intuition] way back when that has never been
discredited. Suppose that we decide to create an objective test of grammaticality and create
something like a lie detector machine that one straps a native speaker in. If you read the
speaker [an ungrammatical sentence,] she'll perspire and the needle will go haywire ...
because the objective test has proved it's not grammatical .... [T]he calibration of our
machine is going to be based on the intuitions of the native speaker. It's unavoidable. You
must refer to the native speaker's intuition ... to calibrate your [otherwise objective]
machine.
Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 39, at 918.
126. Cf. gingerly CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINIsM UNMODIFIED: DiscouRsEs ON LIFE AND
LAW (1989).
127. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHt. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
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meaning." Textualism makes a herculean effort to preclude judicial
consideration of extrinsic indicia of meaning because it fears that these
interpretive practices may misdirect the crucial project of linking words
with their meanings. By contrast, the antiformalist schools of legal realism
and critical legal studies "maintain that the principal feature of judicial
behavior is something internal to the judge," that "external instructions"
and influences "make very little difference in what judges do."12
Extended to its logical end, linguistic introspection points to the
interpreter-and not the text-as the source of legal meaning.1 29 At its
worst, the new textualism has so willfully denied the role of the judicial
interpreter that it fails to see the seething normative debate lurking in the
directive to use "established canons of [statutory] construction."' 30 This
sort of new textualist is the Dorian Gray of American law, an unregenerate
sinner who projects his political transgessions onto a painting of the sullied
judiciary while retaining the bloom of youth and innocence in his
cheeks.13 1 In the Wilde world of statutory interpretation, the biggest
Skinnerhead among contemporary analysts of legal language is Antonin
Scalia.
B. When I Spake as a Child: The Logical Problem of Legal
Education
The new textualism's claim that it relies on a rigorously deductive
methodology points to a second, even more devastating defect. Like every
other "foundational" theory of statutory interpretation, the new textualism
is a "top down" model of legal reasoning, 32 proceeding from infallible
first premises and deducing its way toward answers to legal problems.
33
Unfortunately, "top down" reasoning bears no resemblance to the way in
which humans learn language or master any linguistically based thought
128. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 39, at 879 (statement of Frederick Schauer).
129. See Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373, 384-86 (1982).
130. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. Cf OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 214 (Isobel Murray intro. 1981) (describing
the dreaded picture as "the painting of a sorrow / A face without a heart").
132. For a discussion of foundational theories, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 324-45 (1990).
133. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoning from the Top Down and From the Bottom Up: The
Question ofUnenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CI. L. REv. 433,434-35 (1992) (distinguishing
between deductive, "top down" and inductive, "bottom up" theories of legal reasoning); cf. Jean-Blaise
Grize, Diduction et Infirence, in LIRE LE DROIT: LANGuE, TExTF, COGNITION 233, 233 (Dani~le
Bourcier & Pierre Mackay eds., 1992) (contrasting the mathematical nature of deductive reasoning with
the discursive nature of inference).
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process. For a sense of the real link between law and language, we may
draw our inspiration from Lawrence Solan himself. Before applying his
linguistic expertise to legal problems, Solan studied childhood language
acquisition. 134 The law will come much closer to appreciating linguistics
when it swaps its image of the linguist as a textual technician for an image
of the linguist as an interviewer of preschool children.
Chomskyan linguistics gives an introspective answer to Bertrand
Russell's question about human knowledge: "How comes it that human
beings, whose contacts with the world are brief and personal and limited,
are nevertheless able to know as much as they do know?"'35 The paradox
of childhood language acquisition presents a particularly acute "logical
problem": How do children, even with limited, unstructured exposure to
samples of speech, nevertheless achieve complete mastery of the phonology
and syntax of adult language? 136 Despite the vagaries of the English
language, any native speaker can boast:
A dreadful language? Man alive.
I'd mastered it when I was five.
137
Linguistic studies confirm common experience: a five-year-old native
134. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, PRONOMIAL REFERENCE: CHILD LANGUAGE AND THE THEORY OF
GRAMMAR (1983); Lawrence M. Solan, Parameter Setting and the Development of Pronouns and
Reflexives, in PARAMETER SETTING (T. Roeper & E. Williams eds., 1987).
135. BERTRAND RUSSELL, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: ITS SCOPE AND LIMITS 5 (1948), quoted in
CHOMSKY, KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE, supra note 102, at xxv; CHOMSKY, REFLECTIONS ON
LANGUAGE, supra note 89, at 5; cf. KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 27-30 (rev.
ed. 1968) (outlining the premises of"the problem of induction"); W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE WEB
OF BELIEF 85-86 (2d ed. 1978) (pondering the problems inherent in the "paradox of induction").
136. See generally EXPLANATION IN LINGUISTICS: THE LOGICAL PROBLEM OF LANGUAGE
ACQUISITION (Norbert Hornstein & David Lightfoot eds., 1981); THE LOGICAL PROBLEM OF LANGUAGE
ACQUISITION (C.L. Baker & John J. McCarthy eds., 1981). The logical problem of language acquisition
provides the starting point for Chomskyan linguistics:
It seems clear that many children acquire first or second languages quite successfully even
though no special care is taken to teach them and no special attention is given to their
progress. It also seems apparent that much of the actual speech observed consists of fragments
and deviant expressions of a variety of sorts. Thus it seems that a child must have the ability
to "invent" a generative grammar that defines well-formedness and assigns interpretations to
sentences even though the primary linguistic data that he uses ... may... be deficient in
various respects.
CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX, supra note 61, at 200-01.
137. T.S.W., Hints on Pronunciation for Foreigners, LONDON SUNDAY TIMES, Jan. 3, 1965,
reprinted in Carol Chomsky, Reading, Writing, and Phonology, 40 HARV. EDUC. REV. 287,309 (1970),
reprinted in 1 NOAM CHOMSKY: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS, supra note 74, at 200, 220.
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speaker can whip even the most thoroughly trained adult foreigner.38
What the child has acquired-and what the erudite foreigner has not and
cannot-is the sense of a grand yet inarticulable order underlying her native
tongue. Although most "ordinary speakers" of a language "are generally
aware" of their own linguistic "conventions, and are unprepared to
articulate them,' 39 they know an ungrammatical sentence when they hear
one."' Ordinary speakers also know that naked syntax does not a
sentence make, as Chomsky illustrated with his famous example, "Colorless
green ideas sleep furiously."'' The totality of these linguistic intuitions
gives rise to "a feeling for a language, or Sprachgeftihl."'42 At a certain
level of abstraction, the loose, multifaceted nature of a Sprachgeftihl
resembles Wittgenstein's notion of "familial relationship"; 43 it is a
network of similarities rather than a single, defining characteristic that
distinguishes one language from another. A group that shares a
Sprachgefihl constitutes the significant social unit in linguistics: the speech
community.'" Such a community shares not only the underlying conven-
tions of a common langue, but also the day-to-day interactions that make
up their common parole.4 The speech community's web of phonologi-
138. See, eg., R. Bley-Vroman, The Logical Problem of Foreign Language Learning, 20
LINGUISTIC ANAL. 3 (1990); M.H. Long, Matural Constraints on Language Development, 12 STUD.
SECOND LANG, ACQUISITION 251 (1990); Elissa L. Newport, Maturational Constraints on Language
Learning, 14 CoGNrTIvE SC. 11 (1990). This evidence merits an observation and a recommendation
on a particular application of linguistics to substantive law. Although children readily master a second
language, this gift is a depleting asset. Immigrant children first exposed to English between the ages
of 3 and 7 eventually speak English just as well as their American-born counterparts, but the magic
spark of childhood language acquisition progressively dwindles until it is extinguished by puberty.
Mandatory bilingual education limits the immigrant child's exposure to everyday English, thus retarding
the child's mastery of the new language. A linguistically informed perspective suggests that legal
measures mandating bilingual education serve less to safeguard the best interests of immigrant children
and more to appease the political interests of immigrant parents. Cf. Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 IOWA L.
REV. 145, 164-65 (1994) (discussing how different perceptions of assimilation can spark
intergenerational disagreements within immigrant families).
139. Cunningham et al., supra note 2, at 1569.
140. Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (retorting "I know
it when I see it" in response to the criticism that the Supreme Court had failed to formulate a
constitutional definition of obscenity).
141. CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES, supra note 75, at 15.
142. HJELMSLEV, supra note 56, at 44 (emphasis in original).
143. See WIrrGENSTEIN, supra note 67, § 66-71, at 31-34.
144. See DELL HYMES, FOUNDATIONS IN SOCIOLINGUISTICS 51 (1974) (defining a speech
community as "a community sharing knowledge of rules for the conduct and interpretation of speech");
Cunningham et al., supra note 2, at 1563 n.8.
145. See SAUSSURE, supra note 19, at 25-26, 112. I am liberally updating Saussure's "concept of
langue as merely a systematic inventory of items" to include what Chomsky called "underlying
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cal, morphological, and syntactic conventions comprise the first-and
arguably the most enduring--set of rules that each human being acquires.
The logical problem of language acquisition is probably the most
succinct, most accurate linguistic model of legal education. Learning the
law is like learning a language. Call it a "foreign" language, since all law
students come fully equipped with a natural language and none (presum-
ably) have ever spoken the formal language of the law before matriculating.
First-year classes in law school have the atmosphere of a Berlitz course;
exotic words such as assumpsit and res ipsa loquitur fill the air,'46 and
selected images help acclimate students to the law as a "foreign" cul-
ture. 47 Once law professors have finished giving basic semantic lessons
in legal "vocabulary," they spend the remainder of available class time
sharpening their students' grasp of the syntax of legal language-namely,
the range and appropriate organization of arguments that legal
decisionmakers are willing and able to credit. On occasion the law school
as foreign language academy sends its students to a clinical "language lab,"
perhaps even on a fluency-building field trip by way of an internship or
clerkship. Imagining legal education as an exercise in building foreign
language competency captures the best sense of White and Cunningham's
"translation" metaphor. An encounter between a native speaker and a
foreigner forces the native speaker "to recognize [hidden linguistic]
complexities" so that she can explain her speech community's linguistic
conventions to the outsider. 148 There may not be a more generous
description of law teaching.
The duration and progression of legal education resemble those of
primary language acquisition. Phonological development in children
precedes morphological and syntactic development, as it must; 49 like-
competence," or "a system of generative processes." CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX,
supra note 61, at 4.
146. Cf Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 39, at 810-11 (statement of Schauer) (noting
that words such as "habeas corpus" and "assumpsit" have "plain or literal meanings within certain
technical domains even though they are unknown to many speakers of standard English," while others,
such as "penalty" have, "in some domains, plain or literal meanings that diverge from the plain or literal
meanings they would have in Standard English").
147. Cf. Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34
AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985) (criticizing JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT
(4th ed. 1982) for reprinting a disproportionately high number of male judges' portraits).
148. Cunningham et al., supra note 2, at 1569 n.27.
149. For overviews of the far more heated debate over the priority of semantic or syntactic
development in childhood language acquisition, see GENEvIAVE BRAMAUD DU BOUCHERON, LA
MtMOIRE StMANTIQUE DE L'ENFANT 19-20 (1981); GOODLUCK, supra note 61, §§ 4.6-4.6.2, at 99-106
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wise, there is universal agreement that the first year of legal training must
include an introduction to basic legal concepts such as the Hohfeldian
classification of rights and duties. By the age of three, children "have a
complex, structurally-based system [of syntactic knowledge] which obeys
many of the principles governing the adult grammar."15 After three
years, the legal academy catapults its students into the outside world.
Virtually all law school graduates become duly licensed to practice law in
one sense or another; some actually begin their careers by drafting legal
opinions for the highest legal tribunals in the country. This presents a
"logical problem" akin to that of childhood language acquisition: how can
"the youthful... agents of House members, Senators, and Supreme Court
Justices" be trusted to produce the country's most significant "legislative
and judicial documents"?' The reason we survive the "surprising
juvenescence" of the law'52 may be that the young lawyer, like the child,
has already acquired the underlying "syntax" of the law, primarily through
unstructured, haphazard exposure to different examples of legal argument.
Additional seasoning adds vocabulary and rhetorical sophistication, but
three years are enough to equip law students with the basic intellectual
tools of lawyening "'3
As with language, so with law. The linguistic parallel helps explain why
"[r]easoning by analogy is the most familiar form of legal reasoning." '54
The predominance of analogical reasoning in law leaves most lawyers "not
able to explain the basis" for their legal judgments "in much depth or
detail."' 55 Even in the absence of a "large-scale theory" of law, lawyers
"reason anyway." '156 Law as a linguistic process seeks something much
(concluding that syntax precedes semantics).
150. GOODLUCK, supra note 61, § 4.4.4, at 97.
151. Jim Chen, The Mystery and the Mastery of the Judicial Power, 59 Mo. L. REv. 281, 282
(1994); see also J. Daniel Mahoney, Law Clerks: For Better or Worse?, 54 BRooK. L. REv. 321 (1988)
(discussing the implications of delegating significant judicial powers to young, inexperienced law
clerks); cf. Edith H. Jones, Book Review, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing
Federal Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1485, 1492-93 (1995) (arguing
that "law clerks do not significantly affect the outcome of individual cases," but conceding that "their
draftsmanship sometimes, influences the articulation of legal principles").
152. Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1343, 1349 (1986).
153. Cf CAROL CHOMSKY, supra note 96 (arguing that important aspects of syntactic development
continue throughout childhood, perhaps until puberty, even though children acquire the essentials of
syntax quite early).
154. Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARv. L. REv. 741, 741 (1993).
155. Id. at 747.
156. Ido
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simpler and much more concrete than the lofty objectives set forth by top
down models of legal reasoning. One of Cunningham's variations on his
own translation theme describes the project quite well: "Is the interpretation
meaningful, does it make sense?" '157 If a legal argument makes no sense,
either to the legal community that generates the argument or to the larger
community that submits to the law's binding force, it has as much place in
the law as an "ungrammatical" sentence does in natural language.
We don't think; we talk, we do. Roll over, Blackstone; Nietzsche
lives'S8 -"conscious logic is only the 'most superficial part' of human
thought."'59 Contrary to the pedantic dogma that inculcates "the habit of
thinking [about] what we are doing," "[c]ivilization advances by extending
the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking
about them.""'6 "[T]he human problem solver does not generally think
deductively or by exhaustive search of logical space."'' Rather, "real
human thinking" "constantly modifle[s] and extend[s] by parallels, models,
and metaphors." 62 The law's natural "focus on particulars" leads to
"incompletely theorized" judgments that nevertheless maintain a certain
consistency in decisional principles [operating] at a low or intermediate
level of abstraction.'63 The survival instinct dictates as much: Even W.V.
Quine, despite belittling "[i]nduction" as a "not peculiarly intellectual"
activity, conceded that the virtue of simplicity in hypothesis and an "innate
sensitivity to certain traits" are both driven by "natural selection."'16
The similarities that law shares with natural language also explain why
the barriers to entry into the law as an intellectual subculture are so
shockingly low. The short duration of American legal education and its
157. Cunningham, A Search for Common Sense, supra note 6, at 542.
158. Contra Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 2523 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (boasting that "the original and enduring American" vision of law "sprang not from the
philosophy of Nietzsche but from the jurisprudence of Blackstone").
159. Jim Chen, Book Review, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 599,603-04 (1994/95) (quoting FRIEDRICH
NIETZSCHE, The Gay Science § 354, in A NIETZSCHE READER 66 (R.J. Hollingdale ed. & trans., 1977)
and contrasting Nietzsche with 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
**63-92 (Thomas Green ed., 1979)).
160., Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519, 528 (1945)
(quoting Alfred North Whitehead for this observation).
161. Mary Hesse, Theories, Family Resemblances, and Analogy, in ANALOGICAL REASONING:
PERSPECTIVES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, COGNITIVE SCIENCE, AND PHILOSOPHY 317, 317 (David
H. Helman ed., 1988).
162. Id. at 318.
163. Sunstein, supra note 154, at 746-47.
164. QUINE & ULLIAN, supra note 135, at 73, 88.
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potentially high financial rewards have attracted numerous scholars whose
first love is something, anything, besides the law.165 Although the base
prose of appellate court decisions and law review articles suggests
otherwise, the law nurtures numerous refugees from the economically
depressed worlds of the language arts. The impressive number of
nonlawyers who have commented intelligently on legal subjects testifies to
the relative ease of acquiring law as a second language. These trends
suggest that lawyers and legal educators might profitably reorient their
culture as one based on artistic inference rather than the rigid, deductive
dogma of social science. The flowering of law and economics is not
contrary evidence; honestly practiced, economics is a branch of rhetoric
rather than a precise science. 66
"Top down," foundationalist approaches to interpretation should be the
first victim of the triumph of art over social science as an intellectual
model for the law. Understanding the dynamics of "ordinary language"
leads not to a dogma dominated by a false promise of "plain meaning," but
a much more pragmatic, "bottom up" vision of legal interpretation. 67
Ironically, the antitextualist approach called "practical reason" is the
interpretive methodology that most resembles language acquisition in
practice. By outperforming every foundational theory of statutory
interpretation in predicting what the courts of law will do in fact, practical
reason has come closer than any other approach to achieving "explanatory
adequacy."' 169 The legal instinct that propels practical reason has survived
numerous efforts to redefine American law according to the arbitrary
dictates of one grand theory or another. Practical reason owes this
durability to the analogical process. As in language, analogy in law "does
165. See Posner, supra note 51, at 1510-11.
166. See DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORic oF EcoNoMics 54-86 (1985) (showing how even
the econometrically vaunted rational expectations hypothesis, see John F. Muth, Rational Expectations
and the Theory of Price Movements, 29 ECONOMETRicA 315 (1961), is at heart an exercise in the art
of rhetorical persuasion); cf PosNEt, supra note 24, at 309-16 (defending the potential rhetorical
nchness of economic analysis of law).
167. Cf Sunstein, supra note 154, at 746 (arguing that analogical legal reasoning "develop[ed] from
concrete controversies" constitutes "a version of 'bottom-up' thinking").
168. See generally Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism,
and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992).
169. Compare Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897)
(describing law as the project of predicting "what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious") with Chomsky, Current Issues in Linguistic Theory, supra note 79, at 63 (arguing that a
linguistic theory achieves "explanatory adequacy" when it outperforms other theories in synthesizing
"the relevant observed data" into "an explanation for the linguistic intuition of the native speaker").
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not create new [logical] patterns; it simply extends the range of a pattern
which already exists."'70 In a very real sense, the scholars who have
observed how legal rhetoric tends to follow a bottom-up "funnel of
abstraction" are the Noam Chomskys of the law, the pioneers of a
linguistically informed study of legal universals.
1 71
V. ASPECTS OF A THEORY OF LEGAL SYNTAX
A. Rhetorical Structures
Can the analogy between language and law be stretched beyond its
limits? Law is not a natural language; there are no known biological
restraints on learning law comparable to the "critical period" for language
acquisition during the human life cycle. 72 Nonlinguistic factors undeni-
ably influence the law. The entire field of statutory interpretation consists
of one endless debate over the proper balance between the linguistic and
the contextual. Hence the prominent role of pragmatism in legal scholarship
on statutory interpretation and the prominent role of pragmatists in the law
and linguistics movement.
There may be an even greater barrier. As my colleague Phil Frickey
concludes in his contribution to this symposium, law is normative to the
core.'73 By its own terms, linguistics merely describes. As such, it says
nothing about the normative content of language, much less of law.
Frickey's brute logic carries him toward the apparently unavoidable
conclusion that the law exhausts the useful role of linguists "once the
empirical questions are analyzed with their help and the issues turn
normative.' ' 74 Once again, however, we can cheat fate by changing our
perspective. At a different level of abstraction, we might see that linguistics
170. CRYSTAL, supra note 76, § 54, at 330.
171. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 132, at 345-62; Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use ofAuthority
in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1073, 1101-13 (1992).
172. See, e.g., ERic H. LENNEBERO, BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE (1967); PINKER,
supra note 104, at 37-38, 290-96; S. Krashen, Lateralization, Language Learning and the Critical
Period: Some New Evidence, 23 LANGUAGE LEARNING 63 (1973); see also sources cited supra note 138
(describing age-based differences in the ability to acquire a foreign language); cf. SUSAN CURTISS,
GENIE: A PSYCHOLINGUISTIC STUDY OF A MODERN-DAY "WILD CHILD" (1977) (describing the
permanent linguistic disability of a girl who was not exposed to human language until she was more
than thirteen years old).
173. See Frickey, supra note I 11, at 1093-94; see also Michael C. Dorf, A Comment on Text, Time
and Audience Understanding in Constitutional Law, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 983, 988 (1995).
174. Id. at 1094.
[VOL. 73:1263
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss3/28
LAW AS LANGUAGE ACQUISITION
offers the law a powerful explanatory framework by which to analyze
statutory disputes.
Structurally speaking, law learning and language acquisition are quite
similar. The logical problem of legal education-how one learns to generate
creative legal arguments after being exposed to a limited number of
concrete legal controversies-is a highly stylized variation on the theme of
childhood language acquisition. If both law and language acquisition are
bottom up, inductive learning processes that exploit an underlying
grammatical instinct, the insight that statutory interpretation as practical
reasoning yields argumentative universals suggests the possibility of a
"grammar" that guides legal reasoning and rhetoric. It matters little whether
our sense of justice originates from a biological wellspring (a truly
"natural" law)'75 or must be cultivated through a form of republican
education. 76 For now, the task before us is simply to imagine how a
legal grammar might look.
Perhaps we have let ourselves be blinded by the genius of others and by
our own venality. The sheer technical prowess of existing law and
linguistics scholarship may mislead the careless observer into dismissing
linguistic analysis as a scientific apology for the new textualism. Lulled
into complacency by deconstructionist ideology, many nontextualist legal
scholars assume that the search for meaning is the intellectual opium of the
right. Mistaken inferences and ideological stubbornness are costly
indulgences, for we shall surely overlook the marvel that is unfolding
before us. We stand on the verge of imagining a generative "grammar" for
the law, uniquely tailored to the political morphology and rhetorical syntax
of a system of justice. With further thought and several leaps of faith, we
might sketch a legal grammar blissfully unencumbered by the confusion
that accompanies discussions of linguistic "meaning," conventional,
ordinary, or plain.
We already have the building blocks of a primitive legal grammar.
Among existing approaches to statutory interpretation, practical reasoning
best reflects the dynamics of natural language acquisition. A legal grammar
175. See, e.g., Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange, in THE
ADAPTED MIND, supra note 63, at 163; cf Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, The Man Who Mistook His
Wife for a Chattel, in THE ADAPTED MIND, supra note 63, at 289 (analyzing male sexual behavior in
humans as the biological equivalent of defining and asserting rights in property).
176. Cf Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educatingfor Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. RE .
131 (1995) (describing an ambitious program of universal, communitarian education as essential to the
nurturing of citizenship).
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that elaborates the "funnel of abstraction" already sketched by William
Eskridge and Philip Frickey would, in the best linguistic tradition, describe
the structure of interpretive arguments without prescribing a "foundational"
vision of legal norms.'77 Thanks to these two scholars we can begin
visualizing the semantic and syntactical building blocks of legal argument.
By combining a semantic system inspired by Eskridge's notion of
regulatory variables with a syntactic structure that reflects what Frickey
calls the "faithlessness" of the law, we can anticipate the order and content
of politically "grammatical" legal arguments-arguments that meet the
essential expectations of the law's relevant political communities.
As a start, we can transform Eskridge's concept of the "regulatory
variable" into the basic semantic unit of our legal grammar. 7 ' An
expanded notion of regulatory variable can include not only text but also
all of the myriad nontextual constraints on statutory interpretation. The
"interpretive canons," so crucial to the two-step judicial approach of the
new textualism1 79 and widely regarded to be among the law's most
malleable decisional tools,' are readily reimagined as quintessential
regulatory variables. The product of "an interpretive regime that has been
created systematically by [common law] courts over the centuries," '' the
canons have acquired the characteristics of folksayings, or compact
summaries of broad but contextually contingent truths.'82 Over time, how
one canon or another changes "ordinary meaning" into "legal meaning"
becomes so imperceptible that an "established" canon can be regarded as
the interpretive equivalent of statutory text. 3 Through this evolutive
process, the canons have become an important repository of "public values"
drawn from constitutional, statutory, and common law.1 4
177. See sources cited supra note 171; cf Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid.
Construing the Sounds of Congressional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 513 (1982) (using a syntactic model to
outline a constitutionally informed approach for making interpretive sense of legislative inaction).
178. See generally Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 39, at 940-53.
179. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How the Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950).
181. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 39, at 872-73 (statement of Eskridge).
182. See SAMUEL MERMiN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION 264 (2d ed. 1982).
183. Cf. HJELMSLEV, supra note 56, at 128-29 (describing how sound laws such as Grimm's Law
or Vemer's Law become so entrenched in a particular language's phonology that they become "law[s]
of state" rather than "law[s] of change").
184. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1007 (1989). But see Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and In the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHL L. REv. 800, 806-07, 811 (1983) (arguing that "most of the canons are just
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Defining the syntactic component of a legal grammar requires more
work. In this symposium, Phil Frickey convincingly argues that the project
of statutory interpretation must be evaluated according to its "faithfulness"
to something besides a nebulous, quasilinguistic "construct" such as a
hypothetically "'autonomous' text, or conventional usage, or authorial
intent."'85 Even the Supreme Court's most vocal proponents of the new
textualism have conceded the legitimacy of nontextual factors in statutory
interpretation.'86 Frickey notes that the law, unlike any natural language,
addresses two separate communities and thereby attempts to accomplish
two, frequently contradictory goals. The law tries to speak simultaneously
to the ordinary "citizenry" and to the "enforcement officers and judges"
who are charged with the power and the discretion "to maximize justice in
widely divergent circumstances." '187 Evidently the law speaks not only to
the "speech community [of] the contemporaneous set of literate and well-
educated native speakers of English in the United States," but also to "the
smaller professional subset of lawyers and judges" who are likely to
understand "technical legal meaning."'88
This dialogue between legal scholars and linguists has exposed the
yawning gap between the law's dual speech communities. The conference
discussion of H.L.A. Hart's famous "no vehicles in the park" problem'89
revealed an especially telling contrast. According to the linguists, the true
experts on the subject, the ordinary person would describe the statutory
term vehicles as one that includes the ambulance rushing in to save a heart
wrong," especially "because they impute omniscience to Congress").
185. Frickey, supra note 111, at 1094.
186. See, e.g,, Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1804 (1994) (Thomas, J., for the Court)
(invoking the rule of lenity); United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 307-08 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment, joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.) (arguing that the rule of lenity cannot
be overcome by contrary legislative history); Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S.
440, 470 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor,
J.) ("Where the plain language of the statute would lead to 'patently absurd consequences' that
'Congress could not possibly have intended,' we need not apply the language in such a fashion.")
(citations omitted).
187. Frickey, supra note I 11, at 1086; see also id. at 1085 n.2 (distinguishing between "members
of the citizenry subject to the primary duty" created by a statute and "primary enforcement officials
such as the police"); Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 39, at 872 (statement of Eskridge)
("Who is the audience for the canons [of statutory interpretation]? It seems to me the audience for the
canons [is] not only other judges, but also Congress and the population.").
188. Cunningham et al., supra note 2, at 1563 n.8; cf Law andLinguistics Conference, supra note
39, at 824 (describing the Supreme Court "as a very tiny, but important linguistic community")
(statement of Cunningham).
189. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 125-26 (1961).
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attack victim in the park. None, from a strictly linguistic point of view,
could imagine how the category vehicles could exclude the ambulance. By
contrast, any good lawyer can imagine several plausible ways to exempt the
ambulance, even if she finds some or all such arguments unconvincing.
There is no serious linguistic debate over the meaning of the sentence, "No
vehicles in the park." What the lawyers are really doing is debating whether
to punish the ambulance driver (which no one but a diehard positivist
would do) and, more significantly, how to justify a decision not to punish
the driver once the legal debate (quickly) reaches this apparent political
consensus.
Unlike the linguist, the lawyer is aware of pragmatic legal barriers to
convicting the ambulance driver, such as prosecutorial discretion, qualified
immunity, or a justification defense-and of the possibility that judicial
interpretation of the statute can supplement or short-circuit these ad hoc
legal devices. Only the lawyer is engaging in a quasilinguistic, highly
normative form of reasoning that balances linguistic understanding with
nakedly political judgments and thereby attempts, with no guarantee of
success, to reconcile any differences. Unless we can bring this "interpretive
process ... to conscious awareness," lawyers and linguists alike "could
understandably conclude that those offering [a competing] interpretation"
of the same legal text "either do not know how to read or are being
intentionally dishonest."' 90
The real legal battle over the ambulance has nothing to do with the
statute's linguistic meaning. From the citizen's point of view, the question
is whether we wish to deter ambulance crews or even medically trained
bystanders from driving into an otherwise all-pedestrian park when human
life is at stake. As a matter of law enforcement, the question is whether the
decision to prosecute in circumstances such as these can be safely entrusted
to the discretion of executive officers, or whether the judiciary must
announce a rule against criminal liability lest overzealous or heartless
prosecutors punish comparable violations in the future. For instance, to a
court predisposed to describe any legal violation by the ambulance as a de
minimis infraction, the very fact that the question has reached a court is
evidence that prosecutors will not exercise their discretion wisely. These are
purely normative questions that presuppose the empirically verifiable
linguistic truth that vehicle includes an ambulance. The confusion arises
when lawyers use the judicial shorthand of saying that vehicle excludes an
190. Cunningham et al., supra note 2, at 1584.
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ambulance that enters the park under exigent circumstances. A court that
makes this statement is not making a scientific judgment on the definition
of vehicle; it is making a normative judgment on the extent to which
society ought to bend an otherwise obvious and established rule. The
greatest potential for legal misuse of language lies not in the failure to
consult the statutory language, but in the temptation to disguise the law's
inescapably normative judgments as objective quests for linguistic
truth.191
The context in which Clark Cunningham first performed linguistics
analysis of law provides another example. 92 We can easily reframe the
question raised in Warden v. Haydent9 -- whether a warrantless search
made in the course of a "hot pursuit" is nevertheless constitutionally
sound-in quasilinguistic terms. Is such a warrantless search unreasonable
within the meaning of the fourth amendment?'94 Or perhaps we could ask
whether a search took place at all, again within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. The constitutional debate, however, does not turn on the
linguistic meaning of search, seizure, unreasonable, or warrant. Every
native speaker of American English knows these simple words and is
prepared to debate their meaning, even in this legal context.'95 Warden
v. Hayden implied as much when it rejected the sterile legal distinction
between "mere evidence" and "fruits and instrumentalities" as a workable
definition of seizure. " On the other hand, opinions regarding particular
police practices will differ within the law's relevant political communities.
Just how meticulous police officers have to be when pursuing a fleeing
felon or perishable evidence is a question of values.
The confusion arises from that ever so used and useful legal phrase, 97
191. Cf Frickey, supra note I 11, at 1094 ("To the extent that legal scholars and judges hide the
normative ball under the guise of mere interpretation, they do deserve our criticism and, if the delusion
continues, our scorn.").
192. See Cunningham, A Search for Common Sense, supra note 6.
193. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
194. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
195. Lest there be any doubt about popular awareness of criminal procedure in the United States,
consider how many ordinary Americans can recite all five elements of the holding in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
196. 387 U.S. at 300-10.
197. Cf Barasch v. Duquesne Power & Light Co., 488 U.S. 299, 302 (1989) (assessing the
constitutionality of a state law that limited regulated electric utilities to a return on property "used and
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"within the meaning of." But for the Bill of Rights, the regulation vel non
of police behavior during hot pursuits would be the exclusive province of
legislative and executive policymakers. The constitutional jurisprudence of
searches and seizures merely substitutes the judicially dominated common
law for a decisionmaking process conducted by the other branches of
government. As a matter of political self-preservation, the judiciary has
every incentive to describe its case law as as an objective quest for
linguistic meaning rather than a palpably antidemocratic debate over proper
police procedure. Solan rightly described his mission in The Language of
Judges in political rather than linguistic terms: "The issue.., is... how
judges attempt to mask the fact that a case is hard in the first place."' 8
More often than not, the quasiscientific rhetoric of a judicial opinion masks
a discretionary political judgment behind a veil of apparent linguistic
compulsion. The jargon of critical legal studies states the proposition well:
legal invocations of linguistic meaning deny the contingency of the law.
B. A Lecture on Government and Blinding
Is the law so fraudulent that "plain" or "ordinary" language plays no
role? Hardly! By the same token, no extent legal system rests on language
alone to the complete exclusion of the unspoken and the unwritten.
Although the law aspires to be understood as ordinary language by the
public at large, virtually every interpretive approach incorporates nontextual
components. The prospect of a "literal," purely textual legal system is too
horrible to contemplate except as a caricature.' 99 In its more sophisticated
incarnations, the new textualism neither asserts the infallibility of plain
language nor disclaims all reliance on nonlinguistic factors in interpretation.
Frank Easterbrook, a founder of the new textualism200 and one of its most
prominent judicial practitioners,2"' has rested his philosophy "not on a
silly belief that texts have timeless meanings divorced from their many
useful" for providing electrical service).
198. SOLAN, THa LANGUAGE OF JUDGES, supra note 3, at 208 n.10.
199. Cf Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARv. L. REV. 616, 631-37
(1949) (outlining a hard-line positivism through the alter ego of the fictional Justice Keen).
200. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory
Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50
U. CHi. L. REV. 533 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword The
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1988).
201. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (en bane) (Easterbraok, J.),
affd sub nom. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
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contexts, ... but on the constitutional allocation of powers."2" 2 This bit
of honest legal realism offers us hope for bridging the chasm between law
and language.
Let us eschew the tempting of academia, the formalist seduction of the
law. °3 Law does not live by words alone, but on every value given voice
through participatory politics.2 4 The "language" of law is not language
as such. Rather, it is a bundle of independent political values, embodied not
only in statutory language but also in "extratextual" doctrines. A stated
preference for textual analysis carries only the normative weight that is
implicit in the policy "baseline" from which interpretation begins." 5 The
tension between two familiar interpretive canons illustrates the point. The
canon that statutes in derogation of the common law should be narrowly
construed presumes that citizens have organized their private affairs
according to understandings that predate a relatively recent statute. The
opposing canon, which urges liberal construction of remedial statutes,
presumes that discoverable, popularly enacted statutes provide a better
matrix by which to organize a system of private ordering. The language of
the statute-its nonlegal, "conventional," "ordinary," or "plain" mean-
ing-has not changed. The interpreter's values are the crucial-and
variable-factor.
The court's split institutional personality also distorts the apparent
significance of statutory language. In order to describe how an interpreting
court reconciles its conflicting institutional responsibilities, we can modify
Walker Percy's model for describing the link between a symbol and the
symbolized object. While in the well-house, Helen Keller tried to match the
water that was flowing over one hand with the symbol water that was
being formed in the other. Similarly, in this age of statutes, the legal project
most often consists of interpreter's effort to match statutory language with
the legal "meaning" of that statute. But the judicial interpreter at the
fulcrum of the legal Delta phenomenon is attempting to make a second,
crucial reconciliation. She is trying to communicate, through the legal
202 In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.).
203. Cf ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
(1990). See generally Book Note, The Priest Who Kept His Faith But Lost His Job, 103 HARv. L. REV.
2074 (1990) (analyzing Bork's formalist judicial philosophy in religious terms).
204. Cf. Deut. 8:3; Matt. 4:4; Luke 4:4.
205. For an illuminating application of the baseline concept, see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's
Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 874 (1987) (noting how Lochnerian adjudication favored a norm of
"government inaction" in order to preserve "the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements" based
on "the baseline set by the common law").
1995] 1297
Washington University Open Scholarship
1298 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
language of the judicial opinion, the "meaning" of the statute to two
distinct audiences: the populace bound by primary legal duties as well as
the administrative apparatus charged with the obligation to enforce the law.
This is why "[h]ypotheticals about domestic employees instructed to fetch
soupmeat, however informative about communication in nonlegal contexts,
do not seem ... to capture the heart of the problem when the coercive
power of the law is involved."2 6 The principal concern "' is political
rather than epistemological or hermeneutic."' 27
We need to realign the traditional distinction between the textual and the
nontextual according to the law's political dualism. Lawyers and academics
across the ideological spectrum have failed to articulate the political
function of text. The most slavish supporters of the new textualism defend
their technique as an "apolitical" interpretive approach. For their part,
proponents of competing interpretive techniques have undervalued the
political significance of statutory language, perhaps in an overzealous effort
to offset the new textualism's more outlandish normative claims. The
significance of text becomes much clearer once we consider how the
interpreter at the center of any legal dispute must serve multiple constituen-
cies.
In a society where citizens presumably read the law,0 8 statutory
language is the law. "Ordinary" language-unmodified by substantive
concerns regarding federalism, separation of powers, or other constitutional
concerns-is what the law says and what the law means. A judicial search
for "ordinary meaning" comes closest to capturing the intent of the enacting
legislature, whose members are presumably the most direct representatives
of the citizenry. Honoring the ordinary citizen's unassisted reading of a
statute best serves the rule of law. This process so closely resembles the
naming function in ordinary language that we may call it the "noun phrase"
or the "subject" in an interpretive "sentence," an exercise in statutory
interpretation. Because the vast majority of human beings speak a language
that tends to place the subject before the verb in simple stentences," 9 let
206. Frickey, supra note 111, at 1089 (footnote omitted). For discussions of the soupmeat
hypothetical, see sources cited supra notes 68 and 69.
207. Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 978 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.)
(quoting Central States Pension Fund v. Lady Baltimore Foods, Inc., 960 F.2d 1339, 1346 (7th Cir.
1992) (Posner, J.)).
208. But cf. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199-201 (1991) (holding that criminal liability
for "willfully" violating federal tax law requires actual knowledge of the Internal Revenue Code).
209. See CRYSTAL, supra note 76, § 16, at 98 (estimating that 75 percent of human languages,
including many of the most widely spoken, that impose a structure on word order tend to place the
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us place this "noun phrase" on the left side of our legal grammar.
By contrast, the specialized law enforcement audience recognizes that the
law is not only a body of statutory language, but also a mass of legal
principles that modifies legal language. Some, such as the rule of
lenity,2"' arise from constitutional concerns; others, such as a preference
for liberal application of antitrust policy,2 ' give voice to policy prefer-
ences readily inferred by judges from the entire body of statutory law.2"2
The constitutional canons condense the best of common law wisdom; the
statutory canons seem to exploit the transplanted civilian concept of the
"equity of a statute. '213 Because these regulatory variables modify and
rechannel the meaning of statutory language as the legal "noun" of every
interpretive "sentence," let us call this the "verb phrase" of our legal
grammar and place it to the right.
The two halves of every interpretive "sentence" are at war with each
other. Frickey succinctly describes the problem of reconciling the two sides
as a crisis of faith, for no judge can serve two masters. 4 As Paul
Campos states the dilemma, a judge either interprets a legal text as the
agent of the drafting legislature or else engages in the altogether different
enterprise of "reauthoring" the text.2" The legal interpreter day by day
must choose "'one of these things tway'": the faithful but ugly, or the
beautiful but unfaithful. 216 "Faithful," literal statutory readings offend
broader legal values, but more equitably cogent interpretations do greater
violence to legal text.
As with natural languages, some legal grammars tend to elaborate the left
subject before the verb).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Granderson, 114 S. Ct. 1259, 1263 (1994); United States v.
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 939 (1988).
211. See, e.g., Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2586
(1993).
212. For examples of how courts treat codes or related statutes as sources of principled law, see
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal.
1975).
213. See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CrIL LAW TRADmON 40-94 (1969); Konrad
Zweigert & Hans-Jirgen Puttfarken, Statutory Interpretation-Civilian Style, 44 TuLANE L. REv. 704
(1970).
214. See Frickey, supra note 111, at 1086; cf. Matt. 6:24; Luke 16:13.
215. See Campos, supra note 26, at 1093.
216. GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE CANTERBURY TALES 182 (Michael Murphy ed., 1991) ("Choose
now,' quod she, 'one of these things tway: / To have me foul and old till that I die, / And be to you
a true, humble wife, / And never you displease in all my life; / Or else you will have me young and
fair, / And take your fiventure of the repair I That shall be to your house because of me, / (Or in some
other place it may well be).").
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branch, while others orient themselves toward the right. Natural languages
that tend to place the subject before the verb have three possible positions
for the object: (1) after both the subject and the verb, or SVO, (2) between
the subject and the verb, or SOV, or (3) before both the subject and the
verb, or OSV. Though theoretically possible, OSV syntax is so rare among
human languages that its use in The Empire Strikes Back and The Return
of the Jedi217 gives the extraterrestrial Yoda a truly exotic aura in these
movies."8 On the fiffieth anniversary of V-J Day, we can avoid both a
war of words and a war of the worlds by confining ourselves to the syntatic
patterns represented by the leading languages of World War II. SVO
languages such as English and French are "right-branching" in the sense
that the head of a phrase appears on the left and modifying material
accumulates to the right.2" 9 In right-branching languages, relative clauses
follow the noun they modify. By contrast, SOV languages such as Japanese
and, to a much lesser extent, German are "left-branching" in that they plant
the head of a phrase on the right and extend modifications toward the left.
Relative clauses thus precede the noun they modify.22 °
To see the difference, compare the following sentences in English and
in Japanese:
English (right-branching): The lawyer who studies linguistics will suc-
ceed.
Japanese (left-branching): Gengogaku o benkyoshita bengoshi-wa
seikosuru.
Morphological gloss: Linguistics has studied lawyer-subject will
succeed.
In English, the noun lawyer serves as the head of the sentence; both the
modifying phrase who studies linguistics and the verb phrase will succeed
follow the head. In Japanese, the two verbs benkyoshita ("study") and
seikosuru ("succeed") anchor the subordinate clause and the independent
clause, and modifying material is built up before, or to the left of, these
heads.
As applied to law, the distinction between right- and left-branching
217. See THE EMPIRE STRIKEs BACK (Twentieth Century Fox 1981); THE RETURN OF THE JEDI
(Twentieth Century Fox 1983).
218. See CRYSTAL, supra note 76, § 16, at 98 (quoting Yoda as saying, among other things, "When
nine hundred years you reach, look as good you will not").
219. See GOODLUCK, supra note 61, § 4.1.1, at 63; see also id. § 4.6.1, at 103 (noting that VSO
languages share the right-branching tendencies of SVO languages).
220. See id. § 4.1.1, at 63.
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separates text from context, the "plain meaning" of a statute from a "same
reading" of a statute. Practical reason's funnel of abstraction posits that
virtually every effort to interpret a statute in the United States begins by
examining statutory text and moves through progressively less authoritative
indicators of statutory meaning. 1 Syntactically speaking, American legal
rhetoric puts textual "subjects" before nontextual "verbs." But S-V
languages can feel quite different, thanks to the difference between right-
branching syntax and left-branching syntax. There may be a similar divide
in American law. A right-branching system of legal rhetoric places the
"head" of each interpretive sentence on the left side of our legal grammar,
in the rule-of-law "noun phrase." The placement of the head to the left
suggests a paramount interest in legislative supremacy, and a rightward
sweep through nontextual regulatory variables links the interest in the rule
of law with the process-oriented and substantive interests expressed in the
institutional "verb phrase" on the right side. By contrast, a left-branching
system of legal rhetoric declares a broader institutional interest as the
"head" of the interpretive process and then pivots leftward through other
regulatory variables, including rule-of-law values implicit in a commitment
to legal texts.
How do established approaches to statutory interpretation fit within this
sort of analysis? As a matter of vocabulary alone, the legal process
technique perfected by Hart and Sacks seems replete with process- or
policy-oriented interpretive doctrines that dominate the "verbal" branch of
our legal grammar. Witness the prominence of the lenity and constitutional-
ity canons in the legal process literature. As a matter of method, The Legal
Process explicitly prescribes a left-branching approach. Consider Hart and
Sacks's "concise statement of the task" that confronts the judicial
interpreter:
In interpreting a statute a court should:
1. Decide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and to any
subordinate provision of it which may be involved; and then
2. Interpret the words of the statute immediately in question so as to carry
out the purpose as best it can, making sure, however, that it does not give the
words either -
(a) a meaning they will not bear, or
(b) a meaning which would violate an established policy of clear
statement.222
221. See sources cited supra note 171.
222. HART & SACKS, supra note 69, at 1374 (emphasis added).
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By declaring statutory purpose to be the primary goal of statutory
orientation, legal process plants the rhetorical pivot of its interpretive
methodology at the far right end. Although Hart and Sacks's second step
implies a preference for textual integrity over "established polic[ies] of
clear statement," this single right-branching tendency does not offset the
overarching left-branching proclivity of legal process.223 The judicial
assumption "that the legislature [is] made up of reasonable persons
pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably" dominates any textually based,
rule-of-law interest. 4 Indeed, Hart and Sacks explicitly conceded that
"[t]he meaning of words can almost always be narrowed if the context
seems to call for narrowing."
The new textualism provides an interesting contrast-and exhibits some
startling similarities. Its "noun-" or "text-heavy" vocabulary suggests that
textualist judges guide their readings of statutory language primarily by
"adjectival" textual canons such as eusdem generis, noscitur a sociis, and
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.26 By its terms, the new textualism
proclaims a right-branching methodology:
[F]irst, find the ordinary meaning of [a statute's] language in its textual
context; and second, using established canons of construction, ask whether
there is any clear indication that some permissible meaning other than the
ordinary one applies. If not-and especially if a good reason for the ordinary
meaning appears plain-we apply that ordinary meaning. 7
Unlike the legal process formula, the textualist recipe puts statutory
language at the head of its interpretive sentences. This is the hallmark of
a right-branching system of legal rhetoric: The rule of law rests on textual
primacy and legislative supremacy.228 If the new textualism limited its
223. Cf. GOODLUCKsupra note 61, § 4.1.1, at 64 (noting that the organization ofphrases frequently
deviates from the pattern suggested by the overall right- or left-branching tendency of a language and
describing the placement of adjectives before nouns in English as one such deviation from the general
right-branching pattern of the language).
224. HART & SACKS, supra note 69, at 1378.
225. Id. at 1376.
226. See, e.g., Thomas NV. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 351, 372 (1994) ("The [textualist's] task is to assemble the various pieces of linguistic data,
dictionary definitions, and canons into the best... account of the meaning of the statute. This exercise
places a great premium on cleverness.").
227. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228. See, e.g., Earl Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation:
Underenforcement, Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 767
(1991); Lawrence Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare
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arsenal of canons to the text-based, intrinsic variety-or at least cabined its
use of more explicitly nontextual regulatory variables-it might live up to
its billing. But the new textualism consistently undermines its stated right-
branching approach by its increasing reliance on clear statement rules and
other constitutionally informed substantive canons.29 The Rehnquist
Court's predilection for the rule of lenity and similar canons contradicts
"the rule-of-law value in following statutory text." '  These patently
purposive concerns have become so prominent that the new textualism as
practiced now follows a left-branching rhetorical syntax that is structurally
indistinguishable from that of The Legal Process."
This remarkable confluence between legal process and the new
textualism suggests that the natural orientation of statutory interpretation in
the United States is purposive and left-branching. After a decade in power,
the new textualism's effort to reverse the rational flow of American public
law has apparently failed to loosen the grip of traditional legal process.
More likely, the new textualism never had the will to power. It could not
muster the supernatural strength to overcome the human, all too human,
allure of the common law and the value-shaping power that the common
law vests in courts. Throughout its ascendancy, the Rehnquist Court has not
used its authority to "articulat[e] ... a text-based rule of law," but rather
to enforce an "economic libertarian, anti-regulatory philosophy" that is as
consciously political as Karl Llewellyn himself.232 She who would reverse
the rhetorical flow of the Supreme Court, she who would "be a creator in
good and evil" must first "be a destroyer and break values."233 This the
Rehnquist Court has not done and probably cannot do. Rather, like the
child learning to speak her mother tongue, it has internalized the prevailing
left-branching syntax of American law and creatively inserted regulatory
variables better suited to effecting its policy preferences. Ecce lex: By
manipulating the "rhetoric of purpose" that pervades "each category of
Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1989).
229. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1992); cf Eskridge & Frickey, supra note
11, at 81-87 (describing the current Supreme Court's regime of clear statement rules as "the Stealth
Constitution").
230. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 11, at 71.
231. See Frickey, supra note 111, at 1090 ("The more one accepts canons aimed at promoting
functional and practical interpretation, the more this kind of textualism begins to merge with other
theories of interpretation.').
232. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 11, at 75.
233. FrIEDICH NmTzscHE, THus SPoKE ZARATHUSTRA 139 (R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1969).
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statutory adjudiciation"-"constitutional judicial review, statutory
interpretation, and administrative judicial review"--the Justices "ascribe a
statutory purpose whose nature and scope enables the court to reach a
foreordained outcome.' m4
Perhaps the best indicator of American law's left-branching tendencies
comes from neither end of today's ideological spectrum, but from its dead
center. Consider the following opening gambits from the opinions of that
eternal moderate, Sandra Day O'Connor:
This is a case about federalism.u3
As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual
sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government. z 6
This case implicates one of our Nation's newest problems of public policy
and perhaps our oldest question of constitutional law. 7
Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. 8
Whatever else one might say about Justice O'Connor, this much is undeni-
able. She is blunt. The paramount political values underlying this
admittedly limited but seemingly diverse sampling of her opinions,
stretching from habeas corpus to substantive due process and the Tenth
Amendment, appear to be federalism and stare decisis. It is hard to imagine
legal interests further removed from the simple rule-of-law notion that
animates the new textualism and other invocations of "plain meaning." 239
It may well be, as the funnel of abstraction suggests, that the American
judicial opinion organizes itself superficially by starting with text and
moving toward less authoritative indicia of statutory meaning. But the
equally consistent emergence of decisive nontextual doctrines in law
suggests that the deep structure of American legal thought plants itself on
a nontextual mooring and pivots leftward in search of textual support for
decisive preferences internal to the judicial interpreter.
At first glance, the disparity between legal reasoning and opinion-writing
seems counterintuitive. How possibly can judges think in a left-branching,
234. Courtney Simmons, Unmasking the Rhetoric of Purpose: The Supreme Court and Legislative
Compromise, 44 EMORY L.J. 117, 121 (1995).
235. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991) (O'Connor, J.).
236. Gregory v. Ashcroft 501 U.S. 452, 456 (1991) (O'Connor, J.).
237. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1992) (O'Connor, J.).
238. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992)
(joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).
239. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 820
(criticizing the way in which adherence to stare decisis allows the fortuitous timing of cases to affect
the substantive content of the law).
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purposive way, only to write opinions as though they followed a right-
branching, text-centered methodology? This is the legal equivalent of
thinking Japanese and speaking French. Again, it bears remembering that
although legal thought resembles linguistic thought, the law is not a natural
language.2" There is a vastly greater time lapse between judicial decision
and opinion-writing than between thought and speech. In a system of
justice whose highest court can decide as many as twenty cases in minutes
and then spend weeks or months crafting its opinions,24' there is ample
time to translate raw instinct into refined legal prose-and thereby to filter
out any "impurities" that suggest the real nature of the judicial process.
Usually, any crucial disparities between the initial, instinctive decision and
the more calculated opinion will manifest themselves in the form of dissent
increasingly favored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the concurrence in the
judgment.242 Only on the rarest occasions, when the battle over the post
hoc rationalization of a decision involves far greater stakes than the
outcome as such, does the otherwise hidden transformation of legal
reasoning into legal language become obvious.243
One question remains: Why? If American legal thought truly tends to be
purposive and left-branching, why do judges and lawyers tend to organize
their arguments according to a text-centered, right-branching system of
rhetoric? Why does the funnel of abstraction capture the expression but not
the underlying, dispositive logic of legal process, new textualism, or the
moderate judicial philosophy of an O'Connor-like moderate? Without
purporting to give a complete answer, I submit that the problem lies in
American law's continuing struggle to reconcile its nominal fidelity to
legislative supremacy and democratic accountability with its lingering belief
240. Cf PINKER, supra note 104, at 189 ("[A]Ithough language is an instinct, written language is
not.").
24 1. See BOB WOODWARD & ScoTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
438-41 (1979) (contrasting the "twenty minutes" that the Justices spent in conference with the far more
painstaking opinion-writing process that yielded five landmark death penalty decisions on July 2, 1976:
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976)),
242. See Chen, supra note 151, at 289. See generally John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds,
Juridicial Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59; Ken Kimura, Note,
A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Opinions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1593 (1992).
243. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U S. 1 (1989); David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by
Multijudge Panels, 80 GEO. LJ. 743 (1992); John M. Rogers, "I Vote This Way Because I'm Wrong":
The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 KY. L.J. 439 (1990-91).
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that only common law judges can achieve a rational, depoliticized legal
system. Statutory interpretation in a common law system desperately wants
to acknowledge legislative supremacy but cannot renounce the historical
primacy ofjudge-made law. The tension is most salient in "legisprudential"
doctrines such as stare decisis,2 4 judicial prospectivity, 245 and statutory
retroactivity246-the most fragile points of conflict between statutes and
common law as sources of primary rights and duties.247 My poorly
informed guess is that right-branching legal reasoning and rhetoric flourish
together in civil law jurisdictions, where statutes unencumbered by a
common law backdrop act not only as sources of public policy but also as
principled law.248 This initial effort at charting American judicial reason-
ing as a linguistically guided process suggests that our juriscentric legal
system, is trying once again to heed multiple voices, to serve multiple
masters, to be faithful to multiple lovers. On this point, there is little that
linguistics can add to the wisdom already accumulated in the law of agency
and the lore of love.
VI. THE WORD MADE FLESH
If indeed "[t]he law is a profession of words, 249 it cannot and ought
not limit its relationship with linguistics to hermeneutic games invented by
language philosophers and other amateur linguists. The founders of the law
and linguistics movement have taught us how to analyze "the actual use of
language in concrete [legal] situations." ' ° As we perfect their technique,
we should move steadily from the study of legal performance to a
comprehensive examination of legal competence, of the language-fueled
engine that drives the enormously creative legal mind. From the limited set
of decided cases, let us attempt to infer "the underlying system of [formal]
rules," implicit political values, and accepted rhetorical devices by which
244. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennesee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164 (1989); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
245. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993); Jim Beam Distilling
Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987); cf Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
246. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994); Rivers v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994).
247. See generally ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 68, at 423-81.
248. See generally sources cited supra note 213.
249. DAVID MELiNKOFF, THE LANGAUGE OF LAW 1 (1963).
250. CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX, supra note 61, at 4.
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interpretive "speaker-hearer[s]" shape the law. 1 As this literature
matures, "we may see in retrospect that we moved toward the understand-
ing of the general conditions on [legal] structures by the detailed investiga-
tion of one or another 'concrete' realization. ' 2
The apparent division between legal rhetoric and legal reasoning suggests
that the law's underlying syntax observes the Chomskyan distinction
between surface structure (or S-structure) and deep structure (or D-
structure).2 3 The complex interaction between formal, institutional, and
pragmatic factors in statutory interpretation may reach a depth that parallels
the third level of Chomskyan grammar-LF, or logical form. 4 Acknowl-
edging the wedge between legal thought and legal expression provides a
valuable first step toward a more complete understanding of law as a
species of language acquisition. The next step will surely require a more
systematic exploration of relationships between regulatory variables.
Doctrines permitting "plain text" to defeat extratextual factors such as the
rule of lenity" or deference to agency interpretation256 suggest that
there may be legal analogues to linguistic rules of government and
binding-the rules that control the interactions between nouns and verbs,
pronouns and antecedents, and the like. 7 As the investigation widens,
its focus may paradoxically narrow; if indeed there is a grammar underly-
ing legal thought, we might eventually conclude that it, like its linguistic
counterpart UG, permits "only a finite set of possible core grammars," 2 s
a limited number of politically tenable approaches to the universal
"enterprise of subjecting human conduct to rules." 9
As applied to law, the intellectual tools used in the quest for linguistic
universals have excavated a hollow core. There are no fixed stars in
251. Id
252. NOAM CHOMSKY, ESSAYS ON FORM AND INTERPRETATION 207 (1977)
253. See CHOMSKY, LECruREs ON GOvERNMENT AND BINDING, supra note 101, at 5.
254. See id. at 4.
255. See, e.g., Posters' N' Things, Ltd., v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1747, 1750-54 (1994).
256. See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 114 S. Ct. 2223, 2231-31 (1994);
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417-18 (1992), cf Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511,521 (conceding
that a plain meaning approach often undermines the competing norm of deference to agency
interpretation of statutes). See generally Merrill, supra note 224 (discussing the relationship between
textualism and the rule of judicial deference to administrative interpretations of law).
257. Cf CHOMSKY, LEcTUREs ON GOVERNMENT AND BINDING, supra note 101, at 153-230.
258. Id. at 11.
259. FULLER, supra note 62, at 122.
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law;26 the law's temporarily motionless astronomical anomalies are soon
eclipsed by superior political and economic forces.2 6 Textualist "determi-
nacy" and legal process "equilibrium" are both fraudulent. The only
stability in law stems from the crude desires of those who temporarily
command the power to legislate, enforce, and interpret in the positive state.
Now that linguists have discredited the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis,262
lawyers have no reason to expect that any prescriptive approach to
constitutional or statutory text will exert a meaningful constraint on law and
legal interpreters. Let traditional lawyers adhere to the illusion of
"principled" legal reason if they wish, for the rule of law is the crack
cocaine of the masses.263 The truth has been within us all along: The
social dynamics of the political system inherently limit majoritarian
tyranny, excessive excutive discretion, and other disasters for democracy
without generating coherent legal principles. Political discipline is the legal
equivalent of the implicit phonological code that keeps lazy speakers from
flattening their speech and greedy listeners from demanding exaggerated
distinctions between similar phonemes.2"
So it appears that linguistic analysis in the hands of a free-market
advocate26 yields a conclusion that reeks of Critical Legal Studies. If this
260. Contra west Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (describing
the principle "that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion" as a "fixed star in our constitutional constellation').
261. Cf. Chen & Gifford, supra note 15, at 1318-19 ("[T]he speedy world of communications has
already eclipsed the fixed star of federal communications law.").
262. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis posited that the semantic and syntactic features of human language
define the range of behavior and abstract thought. See generally LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY:
SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMiN LEE WHORF (J.B. Carroll ed. 1956). For a devastating criticism of
the hypothesis, see PINKER, supra note 104, at 59-67 (scoring yet another victory against the Standard
Social Science Model). Despite his association with this hypothesis, Edward Sapir took pains to
distinguish language from literature and other language-related expressions of culture and to combat the
assumption that humans exhibit racially or ethnically linked linguistic tendencies. See SAPIR, supra note
72, at 207-20.
263. Ponder with disbelief State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991) (striking down
Minnesota's crack cocaine sentencing law because of its disparate impact on African-American crack
dealers vis-A-vis white cocaine dealers).
264. See PmnKR, supra note 104, at 180-81 (describing how every speaker's expectation of listening
and every listener's expectation of speaking regulate a phonological system); cf Jim Chen, Code,
Custom, and Contract: The Uniform Commercial Code as Law Merchant, 27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 91, 131-32
(1992) (noting how the interchangeability of buying and selling roles in commercial markets keeps
merchants from breaching their own rules). The phenomenon of self-regulation is common to all types
of social behavior characterized by an expectation of repeat performance. See generally ERIC
RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 83-105 (1989).
265. That is to say, free markets, free minds, free love. Compare Jim Chen, The AmerIcan Ideology,
48 VAND. L. REv. 809 (1995) (advocating the systematic demolition of anti-market measures in
American agricultural law) with Chen, Unloving, supra note 138 (advocating the complete liberation
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be heresy, make the most of it.2" "'The tools belong to the man who can
use them."'267 To the extent that they have been inspired by Quine and
Wittgenstein, legal scholars as amateur linguists have been crippled by self-
imposed epistemological "restrictions that... simply exclude from serious
study the many fascinating questions" raised by linguistic analysis of
law. 6' If Critical Legal Studies and kindred intellectual movements
continue to confine themselves to the prescriptively impotent tools of
dissent and deconstruction,269 the law's voices of discontent will continue
to miss the formidable critical power of legal analysis inspired by
Chomskyan linguistics.7
In the beginning was the word, and the word was with the law, and the
word was law. The bearers of the word were not the light, though they
came to show us the light. The continuing infusion of linguistic wisdom
into the law accelerates the decline of law as an autonomous discipline.'
Linguists have shown us several new ways of understanding ourselves as
lawyers. May linguistics continue to enlighten the legal project and to
quicken the deadening language of the law. May the law so touched
become at last the word made flesh.272
of family formation from race-based regulation).
266. Cf. WILLIAM WIRT, THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF PATRICK HENRY 18 (1818) (quoting Patrick
Henry's May 1765 speech to the Virginia Convention: "If this be treason, make the most of it).
267. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(quoting a "maxim" often attributed to Napoleon).
268. Chomsky, Some Empirical Assumptions in Modern Philosophy of Language, supra note 92,
at 282.
269. See, e.g., Richard Michael Fiseh], The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 LAW
& Soc. INQUIRY 779 (1992) (detailing how CLS excelled at criticizing more structured approaches to
legal scholarship but floundered miserably when challenged to propose normatively superior
alternatives); cf. Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) (painting an even more dismal portrait of the "storytelling"
technique often used by critical race theorists and radical legal feminists). In light ofhow even Christian
legal studies can be used for critical purposes, see Chen, supra note 159, at 610-11 (making such a
reading of H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTTlTIONALISM: A
THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION (1993)), the critical tradition in American legal scholarhip exhibits an
appalling methodological poverty.
270, Is it any surprise that Noam Chomsky is one of America's most prolific and most despised
commentators on social and political affairs? See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, THE CULTURE OF TERRORISM
(1988); NOAM CHOMSKY, THE FATEFUL TRIANGLE: ISRAEL, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE
PALESTINIANS (1984); NOAM CHOMSKY, ON POWER AND IDEOLOGY: THE MANAGUA LECTURES (1988).
271. Cf Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100
HARV. L. REv. 761 (1987).
272. Cf John 1:14.
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